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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation examines skilled immigration in the context of labor and health 
economics. The research focuses on the high-skilled labor market, whereas previous studies 
either treat all immigrants as a homogeneous group or focus on the low-skilled. The first essay 
investigates the wage consequences of high-skilled immigration. The second essay evaluates the 
international transferability of human capital in nursing. The third essay examines immigrant-
native health insurance disparities.  
 The first essay evaluates the effect of high-skilled immigrants in science and engineering 
on wages of similarly skilled U.S. natives. The extensive literature on all immigrants finds no 
significant impact of immigration on native wages. Empirical results cannot reject the hypothesis 
that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes within the same skill group. The instrumental 
variable (IV) estimates show that a ten percent increase in employment due to an influx of high-
skilled immigrants reduces wages of natives in the same occupation by 2.8 to 4.4 percent. These 
results are consistent with theoretical predictions that increased labor supply puts downward 
pressure on wages.  
The second essay investigates the transferability of foreign human capital in the 
occupation of nursing. The immigration literature shows that the returns to foreign education are 
lower, though previous studies typically use indirect information on foreign education or ignore 
the heterogeneous nature of foreign human capital across occupations. The labor market for 
nurses is especially important because of the growing nursing shortage and its potentially 
negative impact on quality of health care. The estimates reveal that nurses who obtained basic 
nursing education outside the U.S. earn a premium relative to U.S.-educated nurses. In addition, 
immigrant nurses with only foreign education do not suffer a wage penalty. These estimates 
iv 
 
contrast with past research and highlight the heterogeneity in the value of foreign human capital. 
The results also suggest foreign education penalty in occupations with licensing requirements 
should be minimal.  
 The third essay examines the immigrant-native disparity in health insurance coverage. 
The analysis illustrates that immigrants have lower rates of health insurance coverage, 
controlling for demographic characteristics, employment, income, risk attitude, and health status. 
Though less-educated immigrants are at a larger disadvantage than well-educated immigrants, a 
significant immigrant-native coverage gap still exists in the highly-educated population. 
Conditioning on working for an employer that provides insurance, immigrants, regardless of 
education level, are less likely to take up coverage. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 Immigration has long been a much debated subject in the United States. However, both 
academic research and policy discussions thus far have focused on the low-skilled and 
undocumented populations. The U.S. has received a large influx of skilled immigrants due to the 
shortages of information technology (IT) workers and hospital nurses. In fact, these shortages 
prompted changes in immigration policies in the late 1990s, including the increase in H-1B visas 
and the creation of H-1C visas for foreign nurses. Yet, skilled immigration has received limited 
attention in past studies. In a different debate, illegal immigration has stirred controversy in the 
discussion of expanding health insurance coverage. There is little mention of high-skilled 
immigrants, who are generally legal, in health policy research. This dissertation fills these gaps 
in the literature by examining skilled immigration in the context of labor and health economics. 
Using high quality data sets, this dissertation pursues three questions on immigration. 
First, what is the wage impact of high-skilled immigrants on U.S. workers? Second, does foreign 
human capital in nursing earn a lower return in the U.S.? Finally, does the immigrant-native 
health insurance disparity exist in the high-skilled population? These questions are answered in 
three separate essays in this dissertation.   
 The first essay estimates the effect of skilled immigration on the wages of competing 
U.S.-born workers. The small number of studies on high-skilled immigration focus on 
immigrants' innovation and do not examine their wage impact. This essay makes three 
contributions to the immigration literature. First, the paper examines the wage consequences of 
immigration in the college-educated population. Second, two econometric methods, including a 
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new instrumental variable, are applied to the research question. Third, the analysis is based on a 
rich dataset on the nation's scientists and engineers, which contains more detailed information on 
individuals and includes more recent immigrants than other commonly-used datasets. The study 
has implications for immigrations and educational policies. Understanding the wage effect of 
immigration in various high-skilled occupations may help draft better-informed policies on the 
admission of high-skilled immigrants and incentives for domestic students to pursue a career in 
certain occupations.  
 The second essay examines another type of skilled immigrants—foreign-educated nurses 
(FENs). The increased recruitment of foreign-trained nurses in U.S. hospitals has raised some 
concerns. Opponents argue foreign education in nursing may be of inferior quality, and foreign 
nurses with inadequate training will provide lower quality of patient care. This study investigates 
whether foreign- and domestically-trained nurses are viewed as equivalents by U.S. employers 
by estimating the international transferability of human capital in nursing. The nursing 
occupation is unique because of its licensing requirement and high degree of unionization. Both 
labor market institutions increase and compress wages within an occupation, and may result in a 
smaller wage gap between U.S.- and foreign-educated nurses. This essay contributes to the 
literature on the returns to foreign human capital in three key ways. First, the study takes into 
account the heterogeneity in the labor market by focusing on a specific occupation. Second, the 
dataset contains precise information on the location where human capital was acquired. This 
information allows me to distinguish between individuals with only foreign education and those 
with both U.S. and foreign education to avoid bias in the estimated returns on foreign education. 
Finally, important institutions in the labor market, including unions and occupational licensing, 
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are examined. If foreign human capital in nursing is highly transferable, recruiting licensed 
nurses from abroad could be one way of temporarily addressing the shortage of hospital nurses.  
 Immigrants have increasingly become the focus of policy debates to expand insurance 
coverage. The third essay examines the immigrant-native disparities in health insurance coverage 
and aims to address two limitations in the literature. First, the study profiles a group of 
individuals that have been overlooked—highly-educated immigrants—by examining the 
immigrant-native insurance disparities for different education levels. Second, the analysis takes 
into account an individual’s risk attitude and examines whether health risk behaviors play a 
different role in explaining the insurance rates in the college-educated and less-than-college 
populations. The study seeks to understand whether there is a gap between immigrants and 
natives, and how the gap differs between college-educated and less-educated populations. 
Furthermore, the essay examines how employer-sponsored insurance can help to explain the 
immigrant-native gap. Finally, the differential in insurance take-up rates is analyzed. Because it 
is commonly believed that immigrants’ lower coverage rates have resulted from their lower 
levels of education, income, and English proficiency, examining college-educated immigrants 
provides a much needed analysis with policy implications. Specifically, serious public concern is 
warranted if highly-educated immigrants, who have more income and are fluent in English, 
remain uninsured.  
 This dissertation is organized into five chapters, including the introduction. Chapter two 
analyzes the wage consequences of high-skilled immigration. The third chapter examines the 
international transferability of human capital in nursing. Chapter four investigates the health 
insurance coverage disparities between immigrants and natives. The final chapter provides a 
summary of findings and discusses policy implications.   
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CHAPTER 2 
The Impact of High-Skilled Immigration on Wages of U.S. Natives 
 
I. Introduction  
Do immigrants depress wages of U.S. natives? The question has stirred heated debates in 
the academic and political arenas. The foreign-born share of the U.S. labor force grew from 5.2 
percent in 1970 to 15.5 percent in 2009.1 While political debate typically centers around low-
skilled and illegal immigrants, high-skilled immigrants, defined as foreign-born individuals with 
at least a bachelor’s degree, have received considerably less attention. Several world events have 
contributed to the large influx of high-skilled immigrants to the U.S., including the fall of the 
former Soviet Union, the Tiananmen Square protest, and the Internet boom. Research on the 
impact of high-skilled immigrants, however, is limited.2 Nevertheless, policies restricting skilled 
immigrants persist. On the one hand, information technology (IT) companies lobby the 
government for more temporary work visas (H-1B) to hire qualified immigrants, arguing that 
there is a shortage of native born workers. On the other hand, the economic stimulus package 
signed by President Obama in February 2009 requires banks that receive federal bailout funds to 
give hiring priority to U.S. workers over H-1B visa holders. This paper is the first to employ 
multiple approaches to examine the effect of recent high-skilled immigration on wages of 
similarly skilled native workers.     
I estimate the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled immigrants and natives and 
cannot reject the hypothesis of perfect substitution. In addition, I employ an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach and find that a ten percent increase in employment due to an influx of 
                                                 
 
1 The 1970 figure comes from author’s calculation using the 1970 PUMS. The 2009 figure is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
2 With a few exceptions such as Borjas (2005), Borjas (2007), and Peri and Sparber (2008). 
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high-skilled immigrants reduces wages of natives in the same occupation by 2.8 to 4.4 percent. 
However, increased supply of immigrants in engineering, computer and mathematical sciences 
has limited impact on wages of native workers in these occupations, implying the strong growth 
in labor demand offsets negative wage effects. This analysis indirectly examines the impact of 
the 1998 increase in H-1B visas by comparing estimates in occupations targeted by the policy 
change with those in occupations unaffected by the visa increase. Altogether, the estimates in 
this study are consistent with theoretical predictions that increased labor supply puts downward 
pressure on wages, though increased labor demand can mitigate adverse wage effects.  
II. Literature 
Most papers on the effect of immigration take one of the two approaches: the national 
approach and “area studies”. The national approach typically relies on a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production function and estimates the elasticity of substitution between 
immigrants and natives. Researchers then simulate the model to calculate the wage effect of 
immigration on different groups of native workers based on this coefficient. Borjas, Grogger, and 
Hanson (2008; hereafter, BGH) find foreign-born and native workers are perfect substitutes and 
their simulations show immigrants lower wages of natives. However, others using simulation 
methods argue that immigrants and natives are not close substitutes; therefore immigration does 
not reduce wages of native workers. Ottaviano and Peri (2008; hereafter, OP) find evidence of 
imperfect substitution and conclude that the 1990-2006 immigration increase has only small 
negative effects on native U.S.-born workers in the short-run and positive effects in the long-run. 
Peri and Sparber (2009) develop a general equilibrium model of comparative advantage in task 
performance to evaluate the effects of immigration on less-educated natives. They show that 
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inflows of less-educated immigrants have negative but very small effects on similarly educated 
natives. Research based on the national approach thus far has found mixed results.  
 Rather than looking at the effect of immigration nationwide, the “area studies” approach 
examines the effect of immigrants on the local economy. Instead of measuring the degree of 
substitution, these papers perform reduced-form estimates to study the correlation between the 
increased number of immigrants in an area and wages in the same area. Some papers use a 
similar methodology to examine the relationship between immigration and wages in different 
education and occupation groups. Most studies find no significant negative effect of increased 
immigration on natives (Altonji and Card 1991; Butcher and Card 1991; Card 1990, 2001, 2005; 
Card and DiNardo 2000; Grossman 1982). This empirical finding contradicts economic theory, 
which predicts immigrant inflows will harm labor market outcomes of natives provided 
immigrants and natives are substitutes in the production function.  
 As noted by Borjas (2003), the estimated effect of immigration on native wages “cluster 
around zero”. However, a few studies find small effects of immigration. Jaeger (1996) concludes 
that immigration depresses the wages of native high school dropouts by three percent. Schoeni 
(1997) shows that the five percentage point increase between 1970 and 1990 in the share of 
foreign-born workers has led to a decline in the weekly wages of high school dropouts of at most 
ten percent, but the effect on the overall economy is found to be insignificant. Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2007) analyze the effects of immigration on natives separately for professionals, 
service workers, and manual laborers. Using occupation as a proxy for skill, they find negative 
effects of the increase in foreign-born workers on natives in blue collar occupations after 
controlling for endogeneity. These results do not hold for professionals or higher-skilled 
workers. Borjas (2003) shows the impact of immigrant share on native weekly and annual 
   
   
7 
 
earnings is negative across education groups. More specifically, his results indicate immigration 
between 1980 and 2000 increased the labor supply of working men by eleven percent, and wages 
fell by 8.9 percent for high school dropouts, 2.6 percent for high school graduates, 0.3 percent 
for those with some college education, and 4.9 percent for college graduates. Literature on 
immigration generally finds very small, if any, negative wage effects among high-skilled 
workers. 
 While the majority of the immigration literature either looks at immigrants as a 
homogeneous group or focus on low-skilled workers, a few exceptions in this extensive literature 
specifically examine the effect of high-skilled immigrants. Borjas (2005) shows that a ten 
percent immigration-induced increase in the supply of doctorates lowers the wage of similarly-
skilled workers by about three percent. Peri and Sparber (2008) find that immigrants with 
graduate degrees specialize in occupations demanding more quantitative skills and that similarly 
educated natives respond to immigration by choosing new occupations with less analytical and 
more communicative content. Although advanced degree holders are an important part of the 
high-skilled labor market, they constitute less than half of this labor market. By looking at high-
skilled immigrants based on a more general definition, the findings in this study will have 
broader implications.  
 High-skilled immigrants in science and engineering (S&E) have attracted some recent 
attention. A small number of papers document the contribution of foreign-born scientists and 
engineers. Lowell et al. (2007) show that foreign students make up roughly four percent of 
bachelor graduates, 28 percent of master graduates, and 32 percent of doctorate graduates in the 
fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Wadhwa et al. (2007) illustrate that 
non-citizens account for as much as 24 percent of international patent applications from the 
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United States. Levin and Stephan (2001) find that individuals who have been elected to the 
National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering are disproportionally 
foreign-born, as are authors of most-cited patents for medical devices, and founders of bio-
technology companies. Peri (2007) shows that compared to a foreign-born population of twelve 
percent in 2000, 26 percent of U.S.-based Nobel Prize winners between 1990 and 2000 were 
immigrants. Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2008) examine the impact of skilled immigrants on 
innovation and show that a one percentage point increase in immigrant college graduates raises 
patents per capita by about 15 percent. Regets (2007) demonstrates that immigrants in S&E have 
positive effects in terms of research and development (R&D) activity, knowledge collaboration, 
and increased enrollment in graduate programs. Although these studies on foreign-born scientists 
and engineers find positive effects of skilled immigration, they do not investigate the effect on 
the wages of natives. My study addresses this gap in the S&E immigration literature by 
analyzing the native wage consequences of immigration using data containing a representative 
sample of scientists and engineers in the United States.  
Policy-makers have actively managed the supply of high-skilled immigrants in the past 
two decades. Like the economic literature, the policy debate typically focuses on low-skilled 
immigrants. One of the few policies that target high-skilled immigrants is the American 
Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, which temporarily increased the cap 
on H-1B visas issued. H-1B visas can only be issued to immigrants with at least a college degree. 
The annual limit on these visas was 65,000 before fiscal year 1999, and it increased to 115,000 in 
fiscal year 1999 and to 195,000 in fiscal year 2001. Since the late 1990s, approximately 60 
percent of the visas are devoted to S&E occupations (Kerr and Lincoln 2010).  
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This research makes three significant contributions to the immigration literature. First, I 
focus on high-skilled immigrants, as defined by foreign-born individuals with at least a 
bachelor’s degree. Second, I extend the "area studies" approach by analyzing the effect within 
occupations, given high-skilled workers face more of a national labor market. Third, I use a 
combination of econometric techniques to examine the research question. 
The first method is based on the national or general equilibrium approach. I estimate the 
elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives following BGH and OP. I find robust 
estimates using sampling and weighting schemes in BGH and OP and cannot reject the 
hypothesis that high-skilled immigrant and native workers are perfect substitutes. The second 
method is a modified “area studies” approach. IV estimates from individual-level regressions 
reveal a significant and negative effect of immigration on native wages in the same occupation, 
which is consistent with theoretical predictions. A new instrument, which exploits the exogenous 
variation in the supply of foreign-born graduates educated in a field, is introduced to correct for 
endogeneity in the supply of immigrants’ in the relevant occupation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section III describes the data and 
provides descriptive statistics. Sections IV and V discuss the methodology and estimates for the 
substitution elasticity and the effect of immigration on wages, respectively. The final section 
concludes. 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
In order to examine the effect of S&E immigration on U.S.-born workers, I use the 
Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT). These National Science Foundation 
(NSF)-sponsored data contain information on employment, educational, and demographic 
characteristics of scientists and engineers in the United States. Only high-skilled individuals 
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educated or employed in S&E are included in the data. SESTAT is a longitudinal dataset that 
consists of three biennial surveys: the National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG), the 
National Survey of Recent College Graduates (NSRCG), and the Survey of Doctorate Recipients 
(SDR).3  These surveys have the advantage of detailed information on educational background, 
including the fields of major and minor for a respondent’s three highest degrees. Furthermore, 
the surveys ask about an individual's work activity on the job, in addition to his or her 
occupation. Information of this quality and detail is not available in other data sets.  
The NSCG is available in 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2003, and 2006. The 1993 NSCG is a 
special baseline survey that includes all those who had earned a bachelor's degree or higher prior 
to April 1, 1990—whether in S&E or not. It covers a target population of over thirty million 
college graduates. The 1995-1999 NSCG cover a much smaller target population, only ten to 
twelve million individuals with degrees or jobs in S&E. The sample for the 1993 NSCG was 
drawn from 1990 Census Long Form respondents, including those residing in the United States 
or residing abroad as U.S. military personnel. Because SESTAT only includes individuals 
educated or employed in S&E, the 1993 NSCG in SESTAT contains only scientists and 
engineers. These individuals are included in the 1995, 1997, and 1999 NSCG.4 Due to a major 
redesign, the 2001 NSCG was not conducted.  
The NSRCG covers those who received an S&E degree from a U.S. institution in the two 
academic years prior to the survey reference date.5 Once individuals have entered the SESTAT 
                                                 
 
3 I do not use the SDR in the analysis because the labor market for Ph.D. scientists differs from that for other high-skilled 
workers. 
4 The NSF tries to follow the individuals over time; however, some individuals did not respond to all the surveys. Others were not 
present in all years of survey because they became ineligible either temporarily or permanently.    
5 Specifically, the 1993 National Survey of Recent College Graduates (NSRCG) covers the portion of SESTAT's target 
population that received bachelor's and master's degrees in an S&E field from a U.S. educational institution between April 1, 
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system through the NSRCG, they are followed as part of the next NSCG. The 2003 NSCG serves 
as the baseline survey for future survey cycles in the current decade, much as the 1993 NSCG 
did.6 The 2003 NSCG was constructed from the 2000 Census Long Form. Individuals in the 
2003 NSCG and NSRCG are included in the 2006 NSCG.  
In addition to having detailed information on education and work activities, SESTAT has 
the advantage of a large sample size and repeated observations. Frequently used data sets such as 
the Census Public Use Micro Samples (PUMS) do not follow individuals over time. Moreover, 
SESTAT is a more-representative sample of recent immigrants since new graduates are added to 
the data every survey year.7 The sample used in the study excludes part-time and self-employed 
workers and those above age 65 or who have worked more than forty years.8 Individuals with 
missing earning information and those with real weekly salary less than half of the minimum 
wage are excluded from the sample.9  
Table 1 provides weighted descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study from 
the 1993-2006 SESTAT. The third column contains p-values for test of significant difference 
between immigrants and natives. Mean values for immigrants and natives are significantly 
different at ten percent in all except mathematics, aerospace, and industrial engineering 
occupations. Compared to native workers, foreign-born workers are older, more experienced, 
more likely to be male, Asian, Hispanic, married, and have a master’s or a doctorate degree. 
Immigrants are less likely to live in the Midwest and the south. High-skilled immigrants earn a 
higher salary than natives on average. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate high-skilled 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
1990 and June 30, 1992. The 1995 NSRCG covers those who received bachelor's or master's degrees in an S&E field from a U.S. 
educational institution between July 1, 1992 and June 30, 1994. The same pattern applies to the subsequent NSRCG. 
6 The redesign makes it impossible to determine if a respondent in the 2003 NSCG was ever in the 1993-1999 NSCG panel.  
7 Only immigrants who recently graduated from a U.S. institution are included in the NSRCG. Recent immigrants who entered 
the U.S. on work or family visas are not present in the data.   
8 In some analyses, however, part-time and self-employed workers are included to calculate labor supply. 
9 This restriction on salary eliminates 1.12% of the sample of full-time workers under the age of 65. 
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immigrants are considerably different from immigrants as a whole, since immigrants on average 
are found to be less educated and earn less than native workers (Borjas 1995; Bucher and 
DiNardo 2002; Chiswick 1978). 
Table 2 displays distribution of workers across occupations and highest degree fields as 
well as the share of immigrants present in each group. The share of foreign-born workers varies 
quite significantly across occupations, ranging from 6.6 to 27.1 percent (Column  2). Immigrants 
are concentrated in more technical fields, such as computer, information, and biomedical 
sciences, physics, chemistry, and electrical engineering. The share of immigrants exceeds twenty 
percent in each of these occupations. Teaching, social services, psychology, and environmental 
sciences occupations contain less than seven percent of immigrants. In terms of education fields, 
the presence of immigrants is also higher in computer sciences and engineering (Column 4). 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of immigrants and natives across types of primary work 
activities. The difference between immigrants and natives is statistically significant in each 
activity, though the widest gap exists in computer programming and management. Immigrants 
are much more likely than natives to be a programmer and less likely to be a manager or 
supervisor. Table 2 and Figure 1 indicate immigrants and natives sort into different fields of 
employment and types of work, suggesting the possibility of imperfect substitution between the 
two groups. This hypothesis will be formally tested in the analysis.  
IV. Elasticity of Substitution between Immigrants and Natives 
I begin the analysis by estimating the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and 
natives, which is a key determinant of the wage impact of immigrants. Holding capital constant, 
an increase in the supply of immigrants will depress wages of natives if the two groups are close 
substitutes. As mentioned earlier, empirical results on the immigrant-native elasticity of 
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substitution in the literature are mixed. In fact, BGH and OP use the same approach and data set 
yet have found opposite results using slightly different sampling and weighting methods. 
Adopting a multi-level nested CES production function, the model assumes immigrant-native 
relative average wages to be a function of relative labor supply and relative demand.10 The model 
yields the following reduced form equation: 
(1) ln  ln ln      
where  and  denote the average wage of full-time, full year (FTFY) immigrants and 
natives in skill cell dx at time t. The type of highest degree is subscripted by d and it takes on the 
following values in this analysis: bachelor’s, master’s, and professional or doctorate degrees. 
Workers in each education group d are then classified into seven groups that differ by their 
amount of work experience: 0-4, 5-9,…, 25-29, and 30+ years. The level of experience is 
subscripted by x.  and  are, respectively, the total number of hours worked by 
immigrants and natives in skill cell dx at time t. The negative inverse substitution elasticity 
between immigrants and natives, 
INσ
1
−  , can be estimated by regressing log relative average 
wages on log relative hours worked and fixed effects, including education, experience, year fixed 
effects, and their interactions to proxy the last term in equation (1). The hypothesis that 
immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes is tested by examining whether the coefficient on 
log relative hours equals zero, which implies infinite elasticity of substitution. 
 Since BGH and OP have found contradicting results using slightly different samples and 
weights, I test for robustness in the high-skilled population following the sampling and weighting 
methods described in both papers. In calculating the relative wages, BGH include the entire 
                                                 
 
10 The theoretical model is described in great detail in Borjas (2003), BGH, and OP. 
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sample, while OP restrict the sample to be the same as that for calculating the relative supplies. 
Though both papers restrict the sample to workers with positive work hours and salary, BGH 
further exclude self-employed workers. BGH limit the sample to persons who are between 18 
and 64 years old and whose potential experience range from one to 40 years. However, OP do 
not impose an upper limit on age. The weighting methods differ as well. BGH use the inverse of 
the variance of the dependent variable, whereas OP use simple cell-size as the analytic weights.11 
To correct for potential endogeneity in relative foreign-native hours worked, an instrument 
variable regression approach is used. Following BGH and OP, I instrument relative hours 
worked with relative employment, or relative number of workers, in the relevant population. The 
instrument is expected to be positively correlated with relative hours, although its exogeneity is 
not discussed in BGH nor OP. As in their research, each specification is estimated for the pooled 
sample and by gender. 
 Relative to BGH and OP, the definition of skill groups in this study is more precise, since 
I further disaggregate high-skilled workers into three education groups, which are bachelor’s, 
master’s, and professional or doctorate degree recipients.12 In addition, the measurement error in 
years of experience in their studies is likely larger because the actual age at graduation is 
unknown. In this research, work experience is proxied by the difference between the survey year 
and the year when an individual's highest degree was obtained.  
I estimate the elasticity of substitution using the pooled 1995, 1997, 1999, 2003, and 
2006 SESTAT.13 Table 3 presents estimates of 
INσ
1
−  in equation (1) based on methods in BGH 
and OP. In the baseline specification, I regress log relative foreign-native average wages on log 
                                                 
 
11 See equation (11) in BGH (2008) for their definition of weights.  
12 Doctorates refer to degrees such as PhD, DSc, EdD.  I group doctorates and professional degrees because professional degrees 
include JD, LLB, MD, DDS, etc. An MBA is considered a master's rather than professional degree.   
13 Information on hours and weeks worked is not available in 1993; therefore the 1993 SESTAT is excluded from this analysis.  
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relative hours and a constant term (Column 1).  Then various combinations of fixed effects are 
gradually added to this specification to capture labor demand shocks (Columns 2 to 6). In 
addition to the five specifications in OP, I include another specification with only year fixed 
effects. In the pooled sample, the WLS and IV coefficients are not significant across six 
specifications (Panel A). Contrary to results based on the entire labor market in BGH and OP, 
parameter estimates in this analysis are not sensitive to minor changes in sampling and weighting 
methods. These robust estimates imply the hypothesis of perfect substitution cannot be rejected 
in the pooled sample.  
In the male-only sample, however, the inverse elasticity of substitution is sensitive to the 
choice of sampling and weighting methods. The WLS coefficients are not significant under the 
OP method but are significant in two specifications following BGH (Panel B, Columns 4 and 6). 
The results imply the hypothesis that foreign- and U.S.-born men are perfect substitutes cannot 
be rejected using the OP methodology, though there may be very weak evidence of imperfect 
substitution between male immigrants and natives following the BGH method.  
In the sample of women, the inverse elasticity of substitution is negative and significant 
in simple specifications (Panel C, Columns 1 and 2). However, including a richer set of fixed 
effects leads to either negative and insignificant or positive estimates (Panel C, Columns 3 to 6). 
Studies using the national approach typically do not explain which set of fixed effects is the most 
appropriate in capturing relative demand shocks. The take-away point is that a saturated set of 
dummies will substantially reduce the source of variation, increase standard errors, and produce 
insignificant estimates. Nonetheless, results reported in this table still suggest there may be some 
evidence of imperfect substitution between female immigrants and natives.  
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In sum, the estimates of substitution elasticity between high-skilled foreign-born and 
native workers in the pooled sample are robust to minor changes in weighting and sampling 
methods. The results cannot reject the hypothesis that skilled immigrants and natives are perfect 
substitutes. If immigrants and natives are viewed as equivalents by employers, increased labor 
supply induced by immigration should have negative impact on wages of average native 
workers.  
Certainly there are limitations of the CES framework that need to be acknowledged. For 
instance, the model assumes capital does not adjust in response to immigration, which is a strong 
assumption. The one-country model cannot incorporate positive effects such as knowledge flows 
nor account for outsourcing. In addition, the exogeneity of the instrument for relative work 
hours, relative number of workers, is debatable. Furthermore, the insignificant coefficients in the 
last four specifications may be due to the inclusion of a saturated set of fixed effects. However, it 
remains important to address the literature by applying this widely-used approach to a new 
sample of data. The next section relaxes assumptions in the structural model and instead uses a 
reduced-form approach to examine wage consequences of immigration.  
V. Individual-Level Estimation of Effect of Immigration on Wages 
Group-level regressions such as equation (1) cannot control for individual characteristics 
and may produce misleading results because of changes in the composition of workers within 
occupations over time. An alternative approach is a reduced-form regression of equation (1). 
Estimates using pooled individual-level data with controls for individual characteristics and 
time-varying returns can correct for omitted variable bias in the unconditional group-level 
regressions, caused by a correlation between immigration and other factors that affect wages. 
Friedberg (2001) estimates the effect of Russian immigrants on native Israeli population using 
   
   
17 
 
individual-level regressions. Based on her methodology, I estimate the following equation to 
gauge the effect of high-skilled immigrants on wages of U.S. natives. 
(2) ln ∑      
where   denotes real annual salary of a native worker i in occupation o in year t.  captures 
year fixed effects.   measures the ratio of immigrants to natives in an individual’s occupation 
in year t.  are a set of O occupation dummies. This study defines 25 occupations, which are 
listed in Appendix 1. The NSF uses a similar categorization in its research on U.S. scientists and 
engineers.  are individual characteristics, including race, gender, marital status, children, type 
of highest degree, age groups, potential experience, experience-squared, and geographic region. 
Since I am pooling multiple years of data, equation (2) implicitly estimates the change in wages 
of natives associated with a change in the presence of immigrants in an individual's occupation.14 
Here  measures the extent to which wages growth experienced by natives in an occupation 
varied with increases in the ratio of immigrants to natives in the same occupation between 1993 
and 2006.    
 Since  is potentially endogenous,  can only be regarded as correlation between 
immigration and wages unless endogeneity is corrected. If immigrants are drawn to occupations 
with higher wages or increasing demand, least-squares coefficient on  will be biased upward. 
Thus the impact of immigration on U.S. wages, if negative, will be under-estimated. On the other 
                                                 
 
14 Friedberg (2001) provides the following explanation for why this equation is comparable to a changes regression at the group 
level, rather than to a levels regression:  and  capture the “main effects” of year and occupation, while  captures their 
interaction in a particular form.  will reflect the degree to which native wage growth in an occupation varied with the extent of 
immigration into that occupation over the same time period.  
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hand, if immigrants are more likely to be in low paid occupations, as often argued in the low-
skilled immigration literature, the estimated  will be biased downward.  
A. Construction of the Instrumental Variable  
 To address the endogeneity of the ratio of immigrants to natives in an occupation, I 
estimate IV regressions. The most frequently used instrument in the “area studies” literature is 
the stock of immigrants in the previous period, which is likely to have high predictive power for 
the immigrants in the current period.15 However, this instrument may be problematic if previous 
immigrants are located in some areas for wage reasons that also affect the locational choice of 
new immigrants. Finding a suitable instrument can prove challenging. A valid instrument must 
not only be strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor but also be uncorrelated with the 
error term. In the present study, the instrument would be valid if it was a strong predictor of 
immigrant inflows into certain occupations and was independent of relative wages across 
occupations.  
A source of exogenous variation in the entry of high-skilled immigrants into an 
occupation may come from the stock of immigrants educated in a field correlated with their 
current occupation. This study uses the fact that many immigrants were educated in their home 
country to construct the instrument. Because immigrants' educational choice reflect local labor 
market conditions, I use the number of foreign-born individuals with a bachelor's degree in a 
field, whether or not they are currently in the labor force, as an instrument for the number of 
foreign-born individuals working in the relevant occupation. The SESTAT data allow me to map 
25 majors onto corresponding occupations. Because the endogenous variable is in the form of a 
ratio, the instrument should also be a ratio. I instrument the ratio of immigrants to natives in 
                                                 
 
15 For example, Altonji and Card (1991) use the stock of immigrants in 1970 as an instrument for the change in immigrant share 
between 1970 and 1980. Other papers include Card (2001), Card and Lewis (2007), and Cortes (2008).   
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occupation o in year t,  , with the ratio of foreign- to U.S.-born bachelor’s degree holders in 
field o in the same year. For instance, the ratio of immigrant to native chemists in 1995 will be 
instrumented by the ratio of immigrant to native chemistry bachelor’s degree holders that year. 
The correlation between the IV and  is expected to be positive because graduates in field o 
are more likely to find employment in the corresponding occupation o. A health sciences 
graduate is much more likely to find a job in the healthcare industry than in mechanical 
engineering. However, the correlation will not be perfect, since not all individuals find full-time 
employment and those who do may work outside the field of their studies. In addition, 
individuals may obtain graduate education in a different field and work in a field of their 
graduate education rather than their major in undergraduate studies. For example, many 
economists have a bachelor’s degree in mathematics or engineering.  
Table 4 further illustrates the variation being identified by the instrument. In this sample, 
26 percent of immigrants and 28 percent of natives obtained an advanced degree outside the field 
of their undergraduate studies (Row 1). In addition, 73 percent of immigrants and 79 percent of 
natives currently work outside the field of their undergraduate major (Row 2). The immigrant-
native differences for both variables are statistically significant at 1%. It is interesting that 
immigrants are more likely than natives to stay in the same field in both occupation and 
advanced degree field choices. The limited ability of U.S. employers and educational institution 
in evaluating foreign credentials may increase the difficulty for immigrants to obtain a job or 
graduate education outside their undergraduate field.  
 
There may be concerns over individuals migrating to the U.S. for reasons related to 
wages; however, those without graduate degrees are documented to be less likely to immigrate 
for wage reasons. A report published by the NSF shows 37.1 percent of all foreign-born 
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scientists and engineers came to the U.S. for family-related reasons (Kannankutty and Burrelli 
2007). When examined by education level, the report finds 45.1 percent of immigrants with a 
bachelor’s degree came for family-related reasons, while only 28.7 percent of immigrants with 
advanced degrees migrated because of their family. For this reason, I do not include immigrants 
with advanced degrees in the construction of the instrument. This NSF report suggests that the 
migration of foreign-born individuals with a bachelor’s degree is not as likely to be driven by 
wages in the U.S. than immigrants with graduate education.   
In constructing the instrument, I assume the field of immigrants’ undergraduate studies is 
independent of wages in the domestic labor market. I argue that immigrants' choice of college 
major is a response to their home labor market, which has a different wage structure than the 
United States. Empirical results in the literature provide little support for the theoretical 
prediction from simple rational expectations models that undergraduate students choose majors 
with high starting or average salaries. In addition, even domestic college students often lack 
accurate knowledge of salaries. Dominitz and Manski (1996) find significant uncertainties in 
high school students and college undergraduates’ belief of their future earnings after completing 
a bachelor’s degree. Betts (1994) shows fourth-year undergraduate students know notably more 
about salary levels than first-year students, but more than half of the learning occurs in the final 
year. Berger (1988) demonstrates college students do not choose majors with higher beginning 
salaries at the time of the choice. Instead, they are likely to choose majors with higher present 
value of future earnings streams. It is also worth mentioning that occupational wages change 
over time. In other words, the salary level in a particular occupation will be different at the time 
of graduation than at the time the choice of major is made.     
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Moreover, the distribution of immigrants across undergraduate majors may reflect their 
comparative advantage relative to natives, which is not necessarily related to wages. For 
instance, immigrants may be more likely to enter math- or science-intensive majors because 
those skills are internationally transferable. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics on immigrants 
by education level. Foreign-born individuals with a bachelor’s degree are substantially more 
likely to work outside the field of their degree (71%) than those with graduate education (49%). 
While this is not a surprising finding, it shows a significant probability of mismatch between 
undergraduate major and occupation in the sample of foreign-born bachelor’s recipients. 
Additionally, a higher portion of immigrants with an advanced degree have obtained their 
highest degree in the United States, which implies they are more likely to have chosen their field 
of degree based on U.S. wages than immigrants with only a bachelor’s degree (Table 5, Row 2).  
 Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of the endogenous variable, or the relative supply of 
workers and the instrument. As expected, the two variables are positively correlated, indicating 
fields with high presence of immigrant workers have higher presence of immigrant graduates. 
However, the correlation is not perfect. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the relative 
supply of immigrant workers and bachelor’s based on broad occupations in 1993 and 2006. In 
most cases the ratio of immigrant to native workers is larger than the ratio of immigrant to native 
graduates, though the correlation varies significantly across occupations and years. In life 
sciences occupations, the ratio of workers is double the ratio of graduates in 1993 but the 
difference is almost four times in 2006. In engineering occupations, however, the relationship 
between these two variables is more stable over time. The statistical significance of this 
correlation will be examined with identification tests in the next section.   
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B. WLS and IV Estimates 
I use the pooled 1993-2006 SESTAT to examine the impact of foreign-born scientists and 
engineers on their native counterparts. I estimate equation (2) for the sample of native workers 
using two specifications. The first row of Table 6 contains WLS estimates of  and the 
corresponding IV estimates. The least-squares estimates, weighted by SESTAT sampling 
weights, are positive (Columns 1 and 3). These estimates suggest a positive correlation between 
concentration of high-skilled immigrants and wages in an occupation. The covariates in the 
baseline specification include race, gender, marital status, children, type of highest degree, age 
groups, experience, experience-squared, geographic region, year, and 24 occupation dummies. 
The second specification further includes a set of dummies for 13 primary work activities, with 
accounting being the omitted category. The WLS results indicate a ten percent increase in the 
ratio of high-skilled immigrants to natives is associated with a 1.8 to 2.1 percent increase in 
native wages. It is not surprising to see that skilled immigrants are drawn to higher paying 
occupations since the costs of migration are high. Regets (2007) finds a similar pattern for S&E 
doctorates—higher paid fields have relatively more foreign-born doctorates.  
The second row in Table 6 displays coefficients on the instrument in the first-stage. 
Consistent with Figure 2, the ratio of immigrant-native bachelor's degree holders is positively 
correlated with the ratio of immigrants to natives working in the corresponding occupations. The 
next two rows present results of identification tests. The instrument passes the Kleibergen-Paap 
under-identification test with p-value less than 1%, indicating the excluded instrument is 
correlated with the endogenous regressor.16 The large F-statistic implies the null of weak  
instrument can be rejected in both specifications. 
                                                 
 
16 The under-identification test is an LM test of whether the equation is identified. A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix 
is full column rank, i.e., the model is identified. 
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Controlling for endogeneity, the IV estimates of  are negative and significant in both 
specifications (Table 6, Row 1, Columns 2 and 4). The sign reversal between WLS and IV 
estimates suggests the occupational distribution of high-skilled immigrants is endogenous. The 
WLS results are biased upward because immigrants are more likely to choose or be employed in 
occupations with higher wages. The IV estimate is -0.275 in the baseline specification, which 
includes covariates used in most existing immigration studies (Column 2). Because work 
activities such as research and teaching are important explanatory variables, the estimates in the 
first specification and those in previous studies likely suffer from omitted variable bias. 
Appendix 2 contains estimates on the other covariates and demonstrates that the additional 
controls on work activity are significant. The IV coefficient becomes more negative once work 
activities are taken into account (Column 4). The IV estimates in this table imply that a ten 
percent increase in the ratio of high-skilled immigrants to natives in S&E lowers wages of 
competing natives by 2.8 to 4.4 percent. The magnitude of the negative impact is similar to that 
in Borjas (2003) and Borjas (2005).  
Most researchers recognize the difficulty in finding a valid instrument, namely, a truly 
exogenous variable that is strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor. The first-stage 
results reported in Table 6 demonstrate the instrument is not weak; however, the exogeneity 
assumption on the instrument cannot be tested statistically. Since it is possible that some 
immigrants move to the U.S. or choose their majors based on the domestic market, it is worth 
stressing that the IV estimates would be inconsistent if the instrument was not completely 
exogenous. Nevertheless, to the extent that some immigrants have obtained college education in 
the U.S. and may have selected undergraduate majors for the same reasons as natives, it would 
bias the IV estimates toward finding a positive coefficient. Thus, the negative IV coefficients in 
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this analysis are likely upper bound estimates and may understate the adverse effect of 
immigrants on native wages. The next section examines the robustness of the estimates by 
considering various sub-samples.  
 
C. Sensitivity Analyses 
1. Robustness to Demand Shocks 
The first sensitivity analysis tests the hypothesis that occupations that experienced 
increased labor demand are less affected by immigrant supply shocks. I perform a robustness 
check by estimating equation (2) separately for individuals in engineering, computer and 
mathematical sciences (ECM), and those outside of ECM. The dot com boom and the increase in 
H-1B visas induced a large supply shock of immigrants into ECM occupations.17 There are very 
few comprehensive studies on the effects of the H-1B policy, none of which finds significant 
negative effects of the H-1B program (Kerr and Lincoln 2010; Lowell 2001; Zavodny 2003). 
This robustness check indirectly examines the impact of the H-1B policy by comparing estimates 
in occupations targeted by the policy change with those in occupations unaffected by the visa 
increase.    
The WLS estimates are positive in both sub-samples, indicating immigrants are more 
concentrated in higher-paying jobs within and outside of ECM occupations (Table 7, Columns 1 
and 3). Interestingly, IV estimates show increased immigration in ECM occupations has no 
significant effect on wages of their native counterparts (Table 7, Panel A). The results suggest 
that native workers in the IT sector did not experience a reduction in their wages following the 
immigrant supply shock induced by the 1998 increase in H-1B visas, consistent with findings in 
                                                 
 
17 Congress tripled the number of H-1B visas that could be issued in response to the shortage of IT workers. Kerr and Lincoln 
(2010) provide a detailed description of the H-1B visa program. 
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Kerr and Lincoln (2010), Lowell (2001), and Zavodny (2003). Panel B of Table 7 displays 
estimated effects of immigration on occupations outside of ECM. The negative wage effect on 
native workers outside of ECM is more severe than that in all occupations reported in Table 6, 
although the coefficient is only significant in the second specification. These estimates imply a 
ten percent increase in the ratio of immigrant to native workers outside of ECM reduces wages of 
native workers in the same occupation by as much as nine percent. The first-stage estimates 
indicate the relative supply of immigrant bachelor’s degree recipients in a field is positively 
correlated with the relative supply of foreign-born workers in the corresponding occupation. As 
before, the instrument passes both identification tests. 
The results in Table 7 provide support for theoretical predictions that increased 
immigration reduces wages of competing natives in occupations with no labor shortage, given 
perfect substitution. However, increased labor demand can lessen the negative wage effects on 
native workers and may explain why many existing studies find little overall effect of 
immigration on native wages.    
2. Gender 
Next I split the sample by gender. If perfect substitution exists only among male but not 
female workers, as suggested by Table 3, immigration should have a negative impact on wages 
of male native workers and a smaller or limited effect on wages of female natives. Table 8 
contains results of WLS and IV estimates of equation (2) by gender. WLS estimates indicate 
positive correlation between the presence of immigrants and wage levels in an occupation for 
both U.S.-born men and women, though the correlation is higher in the female sample (Columns 
1 and 3). These findings are consistent with the estimates based on the 1990 census in Borjas et 
al. (1996).  
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The IV estimates indicate adverse wage effects of increased immigration on U.S.-born 
men (Table 8, Panel A, Columns 2 and 4). A ten percent increase in the relative supply of 
immigrants lowers wages of male natives by 5.3 to 6.6 percent, which is more severe than effects 
in the pooled sample. On the other hand, immigration raises wages of U.S.-born women by five 
to 6.7 percent (Table 8, Panel B, Columns 2 and 4). The first-stage estimates are positive and 
significant. The instrument also passes both identification tests.  
These estimates are consistent with the findings in Panel C of Table 3, which suggest 
female immigrants and natives may be imperfect substitutes. Although the elasticity of 
substitution between female immigrants and natives is not robust across specifications based on 
the national approach, simple descriptive statistics may provide further information on the degree 
of substitution between immigrants and natives. Figure 4 presents occupational distribution of 
immigrants and natives by gender. The difference between immigrants and natives is significant 
at 1% in all occupations. However, the gap is larger for women in five out of eight 
occupations—life, physical, social, health sciences, and non-S&E. Figure 5 contains the work 
activity distribution by gender. Similarly, the immigrant-native difference is larger in the female 
sample in most activities—accounting or finance, applied research, basic research, computer 
applications or programming, employee relations, production and maintenance, quality or 
productivity management, teaching, and other activity. These figures provide additional evidence 
supporting the claim that immigrant and native men are closer substitutes than immigrant and 
native women. 
3. Age 
Previous research shows that younger workers experience more rapid wage growth than 
older workers on average. Since the difference in growth rate of wages may influence the 
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magnitude of wage impact of immigration, it is worth examining the effect of immigration on 
young and older natives separately. While previous research such as Friedberg (2001) has used 
35 as the cutoff, it may not be appropriate for high-skilled workers, given that many individuals 
are in their 30s when they finish their graduate degree. Appendix 3 displays the age-earning 
profile for high-skilled workers and indicates wage growth does not slow down until age 45, 
which is the upper bound for younger workers defined in this analysis.  
One would expect little difference in the size of effect unless immigrants compete more 
with natives in one particular age group. It is possible that older immigrants and natives are more 
alike than younger immigrants and natives in terms of unobservable characteristics. Existing 
studies find the degrees of immigrant assimilation, measured by cultural, economic, and civic 
indicators, increases with the number of years spent in the host country (Vidgor 2009). Since 
older immigrants have lived in the U.S. for about ten more years than young immigrants on 
average, they are likely to be more assimilated into the American society and therefore compete 
with older native workers more intensively (Table 9). Furthermore, the occupational mobility of 
older workers may be lower, which exacerbates the negative effect of immigration.  
Table 10 presents estimated effects of immigration by age group of natives. Least-squares 
estimates show a positive correlation between immigrant concentration and wages of young and 
older native workers in an occupation. (Columns 1 and 3). The IV coefficients range from -0.35 
to -0.26 in the samples of young natives (Panel A, Row 1, Columns 2 and 4). These results imply 
a ten percent increase in the relative supply of immigrants lowers wages of younger natives by 
2.6 to 3.5 percent. On the other hand, negative IV coefficients in the sample of older workers 
suggest high-skilled immigration reduces wages of older natives by six percent (Panel B, Row 1, 
Columns 2 and 4). The estimates are consistent with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 
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9, which suggest older immigrants and natives may be more similar than younger immigrants 
and natives given that older immigrants are on average more assimilated.   
4. Region 
Next I examine the effect of immigration in different geographic regions. This robustness 
check estimates the local rather than national effect of immigration and is similar to area studies 
approach. Because immigrants are more likely to live on the coasts (Table 1), the negative effect 
may be more severe in these regions. Contrary to expectations, the IV estimates presented in 
Table 11 reveal smaller negative effects in the coastal areas. A ten percent increase in the relative 
supply of immigrant workers reduces wages of natives located on the coasts by 3.2 to 4.9 
percent, but the coefficient is not significant in the baseline model (Panel A, Row 1, Columns 2 
and 4). The negative wage effect is slightly larger (3.4 to 5.2 percent) on natives in interior areas 
(Panel B, Row 1, Columns 2 and 4). A potential explanation is that there is growing demand for 
workers on the coasts, which can ease some of the downward pressure on wages and lead to a 
quicker absorption of immigrants. The WLS estimates are positive in both regions, implying 
immigrants are more concentrated in occupations with higher pay (Columns 1 and 3). As in the 
other samples, the first-stage estimates are positive and significant. The instrument passes both 
the weak instrument and under-identification tests.  
5. Alternative Definition of  
Since the stock of immigrants, including those who are outside the labor force, may affect 
wages of U.S. natives, I estimate the wage effect of immigrants using an alternative measure of 
immigration as a robustness check. More specifically, I redefine  based on the full sample 
rather than only workers so  is the ratio of all immigrants to natives in occupation o in year t. 
Because of the high quality data, I am able to proxy potential occupation of individuals outside 
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the labor force using their field of study. The WLS estimates presented in Table 12 suggest 
immigrants, including those outside of the labor force, are drawn to higher-paying fields 
(Columns 1 and 3).  The IV estimates imply a ten percent increase in the relative supply of 
immigrants potentially working in an occupation reduces wages of natives working in that 
occupation by 2.4 percent to 3.8 percent (Row 1, Columns 2 and 4). The IV passes the weak 
instrument and under-identification tests in both specifications. Note the estimates in Table 12 
are quite similar to those in Table 6, which indicates the estimates are not sensitive to the 
inclusion of non-workers in the construction of immigrant concentration in an occupation.  
6. Accounting for Occupation Outflows  
A major criticism of area studies approach is that natives may migrate out of an area in 
response to increased immigration locally and thus the overall effect of immigration may be 
biased downward. I argue that high-skilled workers have greater geographic than occupational 
mobility in the short-run; however, the negative wage effects on natives may be mitigated by 
their outflows from lower paying and in-migration to higher paying occupations. I address the 
concern of native outflows by excluding observations with occupation changes. Specifically, 
observations with an occupation that is different from the last period are excluded. The 
restriction decreases the sample size from 246,553 to 213,735.  
Table 13 contains WLS and IV estimates of the effect of immigration on wages of natives 
who did not change occupation in the sample. The WLS estimates are positive and significant as 
in the other samples (Columns 1 and 3). The IV estimates are negative, ranging from -0.44 to -
0.31, which suggest a ten percent increase in the ratio of immigrants to natives lowers native 
wages in the same occupation by 3.1 to 4.4 percent (Row 1, Columns 2 and 4). The point 
estimates here have a smaller range than those based on the full sample in Table 6, but the results 
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are quantitatively similar. The first-stage estimates are positive, indicating a positive correlation 
between relative supply of immigrant graduates in the field and the relative supply of immigrants 
working in the corresponding occupation. In both specifications, the IV passes the weak 
instrument and under-identification tests.   
If native workers change their occupation to avoid wage cuts caused by immigration, the 
estimated wage effect based on the full sample of natives will be biased upward and the negative 
effects will be biased downward. Unlike in most area studies, I am able to observe mobility of 
individuals in the data set and test the robustness of the results by excluding occupation 
changers. The results in Table 13 demonstrate the estimated wage impact of immigration on 
native workers is not sensitive to the assumption of zero occupational mobility.   
VI. Conclusion 
Despite the large amount of research on immigration, there is no consensus regarding its 
wage consequences. This study sheds new light on the effect of immigration in the United States 
by focusing on the high-skilled labor market, using a rich data set on scientists and engineers, 
exploiting cross-occupation variation in immigration, and incorporating a new instrumental 
variable. I find a negative and significant impact of immigrants on the wages of high-skilled 
native workers between 1993 and 2006.  
This analysis begins with the widely-accepted general equilibrium model and estimates 
the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives. Assuming a multi-level nested 
CES production function, empirical results fail to reject the null hypothesis that high-skilled 
immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes within the same education-experience group. One 
would expect immigrants to lower wages of natives, given perfect substitution. The second 
method uses a reduced-form approach to gauge the effect of increased immigration on wages. 
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Using a new instrument, the ratio of foreign- to U.S.-born bachelor’s degree holders, individual-
level regressions find a negative and significant effect of immigration on native wages. IV 
estimates indicate that a ten percent increase in employment due to an influx of high-skilled 
immigrants reduces wages of natives in the same occupation by 2.8 to 4.4 percent. These results 
are consistent with theoretical predictions that increased labor supply puts downward pressure on 
wages. Because there is some evidence of imperfect substitution between female immigrants and 
natives, the effect of immigration may be less severe among women. Reduced-form estimates 
confirm this hypothesis and indicate increased immigration has larger negative wage effects on 
male native workers but does not reduce wages of female natives.  
This research illustrates that high-skilled immigrants should be analyzed as a separate 
labor market, since the high-skilled market is distinctively different from the low-skilled one. 
Studies that include workers of all skill levels typically find no net effect of immigration on 
native wages. Even papers that distinguish between high- and low-skilled usually treat all high-
skilled individuals as a homogeneous group. I disaggregate high-skilled workers by the type of 
their highest degree, because advanced degree holders in general command a higher wage than 
bachelor’s degree recipients. This more precise definition of education groups, along with the 
ability to control for additional individual characteristics than were available to previous studies, 
allows me to estimate a more accurate impact of immigration.   
These results have important immigration policy implications. Until today, little is known 
about wage consequences of the 1998 H-1B visa increase. IT companies continue to request 
more H-1B visas, yet the government has very limited information on how high-skilled 
immigrants affect wages of U.S.-born workers. Though some studies suggest high-skilled 
immigrants in S&E make significant contributions in terms of innovation and entrepreneurship, 
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they have not examined the impact on wages. This research reveals that native workers in 
engineering, computer and mathematical sciences did not experience a reduction in their wages 
following the immigrant supply shock induced by the 1998 H-1B policy change. These results 
imply increased labor demand can offset the downward pressure on wages caused by an influx of 
immigrants. While recruiting immigrants can meet growing demand without lowering wages of 
native workers in the short run, an immigrant supply shock into occupations with no labor 
shortage will likely depress wages of native workers. Allowing the cap on work visas to vary 
across occupations could lead to a more efficient allocation of visas. It might also be helpful to 
consider educational policies that would encourage domestic students to enter S&E fields with 
increased demand.  
While the present research finds that high-skilled immigrants have adverse wage effects 
on natives in certain occupations, the general equilibrium effects of immigration may still be 
positive. There is no doubt that U.S. natives benefit from immigration in terms of increased 
economic activity, knowledge flows, innovation, and diversity (Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 
2008; Kerr and Lincoln 2010; Levin and Stephan 2001; Lowell et al. 2007; Peri 2007; Regets 
2007; Wadhwa et al. 2007). Policy makers should carefully consider the various effects before 
imposing any changes in immigration policies, as restricting high-skilled immigrants to keep 
native workers’ wages higher in certain occupations would mean forgoing significant benefits 
from immigration.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the High-Skilled by Nativity 
Variable US-Born Foreign-Born p-value for two-sided t-test 
Bachelor's degree 0.625 0.529 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Master's degree 0.282 0.347 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Doctorate 0.011 0.054 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)  
Professional degree 0.082 0.071 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002)  
Potential Experience 15.589 15.193 0.000 
 (0.028) (0.058)  
Age 41.618 41.760 0.031 
 (0.029) (0.059)  
Female 0.354 0.339 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Married 0.707 0.771 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Have Children under 6 0.195 0.240 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Have Children > age 6 0.306 0.354 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
White 0.873 0.307 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Asian 0.019 0.508 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.003)  
Black 0.061 0.056 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)  
Hispanic 0.034 0.117 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002)  
Region: east 0.219 0.268 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Region: south 0.326 0.266 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Region: west 0.227 0.322 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Region: Midwest 0.228 0.144 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002)  
Occupation: Computer/information 
sciences 
0.104 0.177 0.000 
(0.001) (0.002) 
Occupation: Mathematics 0.008 0.008 0.255 
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Occupation: Agriculture/food sciences 0.004 0.002 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Occupation: Biomedical sciences 0.014 0.028 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)  
Occupation: Environmental sciences 0.003 0.002 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  
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Table 1 (Continued)
Occupation: Chemist 0.009 0.015 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)  
Occupation: Earth science 0.006 0.003 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Occupation: Physicist 0.002 0.004 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Occupation: Other physical sciences 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Occupation: Economist 0.003 0.004 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Occupation: Psychologist 0.009 0.004 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Occupation: Political sciences/         
Other social sciences 
0.007 0.004 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000)  
Occupation: Aerospace engineering 0.007 0.007 0.709 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Occupation: Chemical engineering 0.006 0.008 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Occupation: Civil engineering  
/Architecture 
0.024 0.035 0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Occupation: Electrical engineering 0.029 0.056 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)  
Occupation: industrial engineering 0.007 0.007 0.291 
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Occupation: Mechanical engineering 0.024 0.028 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)  
Occupation: Other engineering 0.028 0.026 0.067 
 (0.000) (0.001)  
Occupation: Business/Management 0.276 0.213 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Occupation: Health sciences 0.116 0.138 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.003)  
Occupation: Teacher/Social Services 0.126 0.059 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002)  
Occupation: Technology/Technical 0.032 0.050 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)  
Occupation: Art/Entertainer 0.011 0.006 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)  
Occupation: Other non-S&E 0.143 0.114 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002)  
Real Annual Salary 64639.6 67517.4 0.000 
 (158.51) (331.31)  
Observations 246,553 54,241   
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT. 
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. Means are weighted by SESTAT sampling weights. Degree 
refers to an individual's highest degree. 
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Table 2 
Distribution of Workers across Occupations and Fields of Highest Degree (%) 
Current Occupation Field of Highest Degree 
Fraction of 
labor force 
working in 
Immigrant 
share  
Fraction of 
labor force 
educated in 
Immigrant 
share 
Computer or Information Sciences 11.34 20.67 6.21 23.94 
Mathematical Sciences 0.76 14.13 3.52 12.73 
Agriculture or Food Sciences 0.37 8.04 1.58 6.91 
Biomedical Sciences 1.63 23.02 6.49 13.69 
Environmental Sciences 0.31 6.62 0.92 4.30 
Chemistry 0.96 20.77 1.92 21.53 
Earth Sciences 0.58 7.66 1.14 6.92 
Physics 0.18 27.14 0.88 22.62 
Other Physical Sciences 0.21 9.01 0.38 9.93 
Economics 0.27 18.31 3.45 15.58 
Psychology 0.84 6.50 8.07 6.63 
Other Social Sciences 0.68 8.12 11.62 6.45 
Aerospace Engineering 0.70 13.49 0.66 12.55 
Chemical Engineering 0.64 17.47 1.19 21.82 
Civil Engineering or Architecture 2.53 18.46 2.84 20.98 
Electrical or Electronic Engineering 3.28 22.65 5.46 27.01 
Industrial Engineering 0.74 12.46 0.96 20.38 
Mechanical Engineering 2.41 15.22 3.52 18.18 
Other Engineering 2.74 12.60 2.38 17.24 
Business, Sales, or Management 26.74 10.56 8.78 12.28 
Health Sciences 11.90 15.31 10.89 15.27 
Teaching or Social Services 11.72 6.63 7.40 5.41 
Technology or Technical 3.45 19.01 1.65 18.06 
Art or Entertainment 1.05 7.97 1.60 9.16 
Other Non-S&E Fields 13.95 10.78 6.50 7.25 
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT. 
Notes: Weighted by SESTAT sampling weights. Columns 1 and 3 may not add up to 100% due to rounding.  
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Table 3 
Negative Inverse Elasticity of Substitution between Skilled Immigrants and Natives 
   Log relative immigrant-native mean wages 
 Method (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Pooled Sample        
Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2008)  WLS 0.008 -0.005 0.051 -0.058 -0.049 -0.148 
  [0.058] [0.076] [0.038] [0.058] [0.107] [0.113] 
  IV 0.004 -0.008 0.045 -0.071 -0.068 -0.195 
 [0.036] [0.048] [0.053] [0.124] [0.171] [0.226] 
Ottaviano and Peri (2008)  WLS -0.001 0.000 -0.006 -0.065 -0.079 -0.106 
  [0.045] [0.073] [0.043] [0.062] [0.113] [0.101] 
  IV -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.061 -0.096 -0.157 
  [0.050] [0.085] [0.054] [0.111] [0.246] [0.200] 
B. Male Sample        
Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2008)  WLS -0.012 -0.018 0.007 -0.104** -0.141 -0.306** 
  [0.037] [0.045] [0.035] [0.047] [0.104] [0.125] 
  IV -0.014 -0.019 0.001 -0.116 -0.135 -0.316  [0.026] [0.029] [0.044] [0.175] [0.253] [0.280] 
Ottaviano and Peri (2008)  WLS -0.009 0.008 -0.037 -0.050 -0.062 -0.165 
  [0.029] [0.044] [0.043] [0.072] [0.133] [0.141] 
  IV -0.009 0.008 -0.037 -0.050 -0.073 -0.192 
  [0.036] [0.047] [0.065] [0.136] [0.300] [0.232] 
C. Female Sample        
Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson (2008)  WLS -0.065 -0.140* 0.084* 0.059 0.094 0.202 
  [0.055] [0.073] [0.049] [0.088] [0.133] [0.128] 
  IV -0.065 -0.139 0.077 0.038 0.070 0.196 
  [0.083] [0.319] [0.200] [0.838] [0.907] [1.046] 
Ottaviano and Peri (2008)  WLS -0.085* -0.168** 0.079 0.089 0.148 0.240* 
  [0.043] [0.060] [0.062] [0.131] [0.169] [0.138] 
  IV -0.093 -0.176 0.066 0.062 0.098 0.199  [0.115] [0.337] [0.175] [0.586] [0.686] [0.526] 
Year FE  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Education × Experience FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year × Experience FE  No No No No Yes Yes 
Year × Education FE  No No No No No Yes 
Source:1995-2006 SESTAT. 
Notes: Each cell contains estimates of the parameter 
INσ/1−  in equation (1) from  a separate regression. See text for detailed discussion 
on how the methods in BGH and OP differ. Analytic-weighted standard errors are reported in brackets and adjusted for clustering within 
education-experience cells. Relative employment is used to instrument for relative hours worked. Each regression has 105 observations. 
The sample is restricted to workers with positive work hours and salary. * significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
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 Table 4 
Identification of Instrument 
 
All U.S.-born All foreign-born 
Significant Difference 
(p-value) 
Obtained advanced degree outside 
the field of undergraduate studies  
0.276    
(0.001) 
0.263    
(0.003) 
0.000 
Currently working outside the field 
of undergraduate studies 
0.794 
(0.001)       
0.734 
(0.003)     
0.000 
Observations 245,330 50,670  
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT.  
Notes: Weighted by SESTAT sampling weights. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Individuals with invalid 
responses to field of undergraduate studies are excluded.  
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Immigrants by Education 
 Foreign-born with 
BA/BS 
Foreign-born with 
advanced degrees 
Significant Difference 
(p-value) 
Currently working outside the field 
of highest degree 
0.713    
(0.004) 
0.494    
(0.004) 
0.000 
Received highest degree in the U.S. 0.576 
(0.005)       
0.686 
(0.004)     
0.000 
Observations 23,194 31,047  
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT.  
Notes: Weighted by SESTAT sampling weights. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The sample size in row 2 is smaller 
due to a few invalid responses. The number of immigrants with a bachelor’s degree is 23,190. The sample size of advanced 
degree recipients is 30,915.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
42 
 
 
Table 6 
WLS and IV Estimates of Effect of Immigration on Wages 
  Log Real Annual Salary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  WLS IV WLS IV 
     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.194*** -0.275** 0.222*** -0.435*** 
 [0.045] [0.128] [0.044] [0.131] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  0.358***  0.349*** 
  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  10341.17  9711.77 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  7141.80  6725.76 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 246,553 246,553 246,553 246,553 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Primary Work Activity Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real annual salary. The regressions are weighted by SESTAT sampling weights and 
control for education, age group, experience, experience-squared, female, married, children, race, year, and region fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered on individuals. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. The sample excludes part-time and self-employed workers and those above age 65. Workers with missing 
salary information and those with real weekly salary less than half of the minimum wage are excluded. p-values in 
parentheses. The coefficients on the other covariates  are reported in Appendix 2. 
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Table 7 
WLS and IV Estimates of Effect of Immigration on Wages by Occupation 
  Log Real Annual Salary 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  WLS IV WLS IV 
A. Sample: Native Workers in Engineering, Computer and Mathematical Sciences 
Weighted Share of Foreign-Born: 18.6% 
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.119** 0.051 0.144** 0.085 
 [0.058] [0.057] [0.058] [0.057] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  1.388***  1.370*** 
  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  46753.69  48873.90 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  7101.63  6904.68 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 92,048 92,048 92,048 92,048 
B. Sample: Native Workers outside of Engineering, Computer and Mathematical Sciences 
Weighted Share of Foreign-Born: 11.5% 
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.229*** -0.624 0.272*** -0.934** 
 [0.080] [0.447] [0.078] [0.437] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  0.148***  0.150*** 
  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  1628.88  1666.14 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  1445.16  1476.55 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 154,505 154,505 154,505 154,505 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Primary Work Activity Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real annual salary. The regressions are weighted by SESTAT sampling weights and control 
for education, age group, experience, experience-squared, female, married, children, race, year, and region fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets, clustered on individuals. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
sample excludes part-time and self-employed workers and those above age 65. Workers with missing salary information and those 
with real weekly salary less than half of the minimum wage are excluded.  
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Table 8 
WLS and IV Estimates of Effect of Immigration on Wages by Gender 
  Log Real Annual Salary 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  WLS IV WLS IV 
A. Sample: Male Native Workers  
Weighted Share of Foreign-Born: 13.5% 
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.172*** -0.531*** 0.233*** -0.666*** 
 [0.053] [0.147] [0.053] [0.149] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  0.389***  0.380*** 
  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  6943.38  6499.46 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  4801.53  4514.61 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 165,946 165,946 165,946 165,946 
B. Sample: Female Native Workers  
Weighted Share of Foreign-Born: 12.8% 
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.289*** 0.671*** 0.260*** 0.500* 
 [0.080] [0.253] [0.079] [0.259] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  0.304***  0.295*** 
  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  3196.96  3035.37 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  2270.91  2150.06 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 80,607 80,607 80,607 80,607 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Primary Work Activity Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real annual salary. The regressions are weighted by SESTAT sampling weights and control 
for education, age group, experience, experience-squared, female, married, children, race, year, and region fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets, clustered on individuals. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
sample excludes part-time and self-employed workers and those above age 65. Workers with missing salary information and those 
with real weekly salary less than half of the minimum wage are excluded.  
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Table 9 
Immigrant's Duration of Residence in the United States 
 
 Young Immigrants  
(Age <= 45) 
Older Immigrants  
(Age > 45)
Significant Difference 
(p-value) 
Duration of Residence in the U.S. 
(Years) 
14.79   
(0.155) 
24.60  
  (0.269) 
0.000 
Observations 7,255   3,951   
 
Source: 2003 SESTAT.  
Notes: Weighted by SESTAT sampling weights. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The information is only available 
in 2003.  
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Table 10 
WLS and IV Estimates of Effect of Immigration on Wages by Age 
  Log Real Annual Salary 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  WLS IV WLS IV 
A. Sample: Native Workers Age 45 or Younger
Weighted Share of Foreign-Born: 13.6% 
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.168*** -0.256* 0.206*** -0.345** 
 [0.053] [0.138] [0.052] [0.141] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  0.362***  0.352*** 
  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  6105.51  5690.44 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  4401.61  4114.33 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 174,683 174,683 174,683 174,683 
B. Sample: Native Workers over Age 45 
Weighted Share of Foreign-Born: 12.7% 
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.247*** -0.207 0.245*** -0.596** 
 [0.083] [0.272] [0.082] [0.274] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  0.351***  0.345*** 
  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  4057.42  3887.46 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  2677.10  2568.93 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 71,870 71,870 71,870 71,870 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Primary Work Activity Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real annual salary. The regressions are weighted by SESTAT sampling weights and control 
for education, age group, experience, experience-squared, female, married, children, race, year, and region fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets, clustered on individuals. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
sample excludes part-time and self-employed workers and those above age 65. Workers with missing salary information and those 
with real weekly salary less than half of the minimum wage are excluded.  
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Table 11 
WLS and IV Estimates of Effect of Immigration on Wages by Region 
  Log Real Annual Salary 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  WLS IV WLS IV 
A. Sample: Native Workers Located on the Coasts 
Weighted Share of Foreign-Born: 16.8% 
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.207*** -0.320 0.249*** -0.490** 
 [0.066] [0.196] [0.064] [0.199] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  0.350***  0.342*** 
  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  4372.26  4117.51 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  3148.99  2965.81 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 110,098 110,098 110,098 110,098 
B. Sample: Native Workers Located  in the South or the Midwest
Weighted Share of Foreign-Born: 10.2% 
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.180*** -0.342** 0.198*** -0.516*** 
 [0.060] [0.167] [0.060] [0.171] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  0.365***  0.355*** 
  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  6091.22  5709.69 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  4092.34  3853.88 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 136,455 136,455 136,455 136,455 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Primary Work Activity Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real annual salary. The regressions are weighted by SESTAT sampling weights and 
control for education, age group, experience, experience-squared, female, married, children, race, year, and region fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered on individuals. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The sample excludes part-time and self-employed workers and those above age 65. Workers with missing salary information and 
those with real weekly salary less than half of the minimum wage are excluded.  
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Table 12 
WLS and IV Estimates of Effect of Immigration using an Alternative Definition 
  Log Real Annual Salary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  WLS IV WLS IV 
     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.185*** -0.239** 0.215*** -0.377*** 
 [0.055] [0.112] [0.054] [0.113] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  0.411***  0.403*** 
  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  16513.46  15668.70 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  10249.09  9744.07 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 246,553 246,553 246,553 246,553 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Primary Work Activity Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real annual salary for individual natives. The endogenous regressor is constructed 
based on all individuals rather than only workers. The regressions are weighted by SESTAT sampling weights and control for 
education, age group, experience, experience-squared, female, married, children, race, year, and region fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets, clustered on individuals. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
sample excludes part-time and self-employed workers and those above age 65. Workers with missing salary information and 
those with real weekly salary less than half of the minimum wage are excluded. p-values in parentheses.  
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Table 13 
Addressing Occupational Outflows in the Estimated Effect of Immigration 
(Pooled 1993-2006 Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System)    
  Log Real Annual Salary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  WLS IV WLS IV 
     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Natives in Occupation o 0.160*** -0.308** 0.183*** -0.436*** 
 [0.048] [0.133] [0.048] [0.136] 
First Stage     
Ratio of Foreign-born to Native B.A./B.S. in Field o  0.373***  0.365*** 
  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Identification Tests     
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-Stat  10529.57  9929.69 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat  7055.44  6655.01 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Observations 213,735 213,735 213,735 213,735 
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Primary Work Activity Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real annual salary for individual natives. The sample excludes observations with an 
occupation different from that in the previous period. The regressions are weighted by SESTAT sampling weights and 
control for education, age group, experience, experience-squared, female, married, children, race, year, and region fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered on individuals. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. The sample excludes part-time and self-employed workers and those above age 65. Workers with missing 
salary information and those with real weekly salary less than half of the minimum wage are excluded. p-values in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of Foreign-Born and U.S.-Born across Work Activities 
 
 
Source: 1993-2006 Science and Engineering Statistical Data System. 
Note: Weighted by SESTAT sampling weights. The difference between foreign- and U.S.-born is significant at 5% in all 
work activities.  
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Figure 2 
First Stage Scatter Plot  
 
Source: 1993-2006 Science and Engineering Statistical Data System. 
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Figure 3   
Relationship between Endogenous Variable and IV by Broad Occupations (Selected Years) 
Source: 1993 and 2006 Science and Engineering Statistical Data System. 
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Figure 4 
Occupational Distribution of Immigrants and Natives by Gender 
 
Source: 1993-2006 Science and Engineering Statistical Data System. 
Note: Weighted by SESTAT sampling weights. The difference between foreign- and U.S.-born is significant at 1% in all 
occupations.  
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Figure 5   
Work Activity Distribution of Immigrants and Natives by Gender 
 
Source: 1993-2006 Science and Engineering Statistical Data System. 
Note: Weighted by SESTAT sampling weights. The difference between foreign- and U.S.-born is significant at 5% in all activities 
except for quality/productivity management in the male sample.  
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Appendix 1 
Occupation and Major Codes 
1 Computer or Information Sciences 14 Chemical Engineering 
2 Mathematical Sciences 15 Civil Engineering or Architecture 
3 Agriculture or Food Sciences 16 Electrical or Electronic Engineering 
4 Biomedical Sciences 17 Industrial Engineering 
5 Environmental Sciences 18 Mechanical Engineering 
6 Chemistry 19 Other Engineering 
7 Earth Sciences 20 Business, Sales, or Management 
8 Physics 21 Health Sciences 
9 Other Physical Sciences 22 Teaching or Social Services 
10 Economics 23 Technology or Technical 
11 Psychology 24 Art or Entertainment 
12 Other Social Sciences 25 Other Non-S&E Fields 
13 Aerospace Engineering 
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Appendix 2   
Covariate Coefficients for Individual-Level WLS and IV Estimates in Table 6 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLE WLS IV WLS IV 
Master's 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] 
Doctorate 0.351*** 0.352*** 0.349*** 0.351*** 
[0.017] [0.011] [0.017] [0.011] 
Professional degree 0.752*** 0.751*** 0.720*** 0.719*** 
[0.011] [0.005] [0.011] [0.006] 
Experience 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Experience-Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age 30-39 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] 
Age 40-49 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 
[0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] 
Age 50-59 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 
[0.009] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006] 
Age 60+ 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.005 
[0.014] [0.008] [0.014] [0.008] 
Female  -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.165*** -0.165*** 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] 
Married  0.078*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
[0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] 
Have Children under 6 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 
[0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] 
Have Children > age 6 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
[0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] 
Asian  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
[0.009] [0.011] [0.009] [0.010] 
Black  -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.057*** -0.056*** 
[0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] 
Hispanic  -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.065*** 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Native American -0.060*** -0.061** -0.064*** -0.064** 
[0.023] [0.028] [0.022] [0.027] 
Other Race -0.020 -0.020* -0.019 -0.018* 
[0.022] [0.011] [0.022] [0.010] 
Year = 1995 -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.007** -0.010*** 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Year = 1997 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Year = 1999 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] 
Year = 2003 0.144*** 0.179*** 0.140*** 0.189*** 
[0.006] [0.010] [0.006] [0.010] 
Year = 2006 0.134*** 0.158*** 0.129*** 0.162*** 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] 
Region: east 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 
[0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.003] 
Region: south 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
[0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] 
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Appendix 2 (Continued)
Region: west 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.003] 
Occupation: 
Mathematics -0.090*** -0.132*** -0.060*** -0.120*** 
[0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] 
Agriculture /Food -0.317*** -0.420*** -0.275*** -0.420*** 
[0.022] [0.034] [0.022] [0.034] 
Biomedical -0.372*** -0.336*** -0.313*** -0.264*** 
 [0.012] [0.014] [0.012] [0.014] 
Environmental -0.279*** -0.398*** -0.247*** -0.415*** 
 [0.021] [0.037] [0.022] [0.038] 
Chemistry -0.204*** -0.221*** -0.164*** -0.190*** 
[0.013] [0.016] [0.012] [0.016] 
Earth Science -0.143*** -0.261*** -0.104*** -0.271*** 
[0.018] [0.039] [0.018] [0.039] 
Physics -0.335*** -0.297*** -0.286*** -0.234*** 
[0.034] [0.063] [0.032] [0.058] 
Other Physical -0.193*** -0.302*** -0.158*** -0.313*** 
[0.024] [0.037] [0.023] [0.037] 
Economics -0.039 -0.027 -0.004 0.011 
[0.032] [0.024] [0.030] [0.024] 
Psychology -0.391*** -0.512*** -0.379*** -0.549*** 
[0.017] [0.035] [0.017] [0.036] 
Other Social Sciences -0.202*** -0.315*** -0.151*** -0.310*** 
[0.027] [0.034] [0.027] [0.035] 
Aerospace Engineer 0.097*** 0.011 0.103*** -0.020 
[0.011] [0.027] [0.011] [0.028] 
Chemical Engineer 0.150*** 0.097*** 0.165*** 0.087*** 
[0.010] [0.022] [0.010] [0.022] 
Civil Engineer -0.053*** -0.095*** -0.066*** -0.128*** 
[0.009] [0.014] [0.009] [0.014] 
Electrical Engineer 0.065*** 0.057*** 0.065*** 0.051*** 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] 
Industrial Engineer -0.003 -0.092*** 0.017 -0.110*** 
[0.014] [0.027] [0.014] [0.028] 
Mechanical Engineer 0.060*** -0.004 0.061*** -0.033 
[0.008] [0.019] [0.009] [0.020] 
Other Engineer 0.024** -0.053** 0.052*** -0.058** 
[0.010] [0.022] [0.011] [0.023] 
Business/ Sales  0.039*** -0.043* 0.052*** -0.065*** 
[0.009] [0.023] [0.010] [0.024] 
Health -0.140*** -0.184*** -0.140*** -0.203*** 
[0.009] [0.012] [0.010] [0.013] 
Social Services /Teaching -0.431*** -0.551*** -0.380*** -0.547*** 
[0.012] [0.033] [0.013] [0.034] 
Technology/Technician -0.183*** -0.202*** -0.163*** -0.189*** 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Art/Entertainment  -0.193*** -0.305*** -0.155*** -0.312*** 
[0.026] [0.032] [0.025] [0.033] 
Other Non-S&E -0.355*** -0.454*** -0.321*** -0.460*** 
 [0.011] [0.027] [0.011] [0.028] 
Primary Work Activity     
Applied Research    0.074*** 0.072*** 
   [0.009] [0.007] 
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Basic Research    -0.096*** -0.095*** 
   [0.012] [0.011] 
Computer Applications   0.104*** 0.098*** 
  [0.008] [0.006] 
Development   0.130*** 0.130*** 
  [0.009] [0.006] 
Design of Process   0.098*** 0.104*** 
  [0.009] [0.006] 
Employee Relations   0.063*** 0.062*** 
   [0.011] [0.006] 
Supervision   0.181*** 0.179*** 
  [0.008] [0.005] 
Production /Maintenance   -0.051*** -0.052*** 
  [0.012] [0.007] 
Professional services   0.129*** 0.128*** 
  [0.009] [0.005] 
Sales/ Marketing   0.001 -0.001 
  [0.010] [0.005] 
Quality Management   0.063*** 0.062*** 
  [0.011] [0.007] 
Teaching   0.025*** 0.023*** 
   [0.010] [0.006] 
Accounting/Finance   0.071*** 0.069*** 
  [0.011] [0.006] 
Constant 10.305*** 10.450*** 10.283*** 10.491*** 
[0.016] [0.044] [0.019] [0.045] 
Observations 246,553 246,553 246,553 246,553 
Source: 1993-2006 SESTAT.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real annual salary. The regressions are weighted by SESTAT 
sampling weights and control for education, age group, experience, experience-squared, female, married, 
children, race, year, and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered on 
individuals. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The sample excludes part-
time and self-employed workers and those above age 65. Workers with missing salary information and 
those with real weekly salary less than half of the minimum wage are excluded. 
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 Appendix 3 
Age-Earning Profile 
 
Source: 1993-2006 Science and Engineering Statistical Data System.  
Note: Weighted by SESTAT sampling weights. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Does Foreign Human Capital Earn a Lower Return in the U.S.?      
The Case of Nurses 
I. Introduction  
The positive relationship between human capital and earnings has long been established 
in the literature. However, most studies do not distinguish between foreign and domestic human 
capital in the earnings equation. Foreign human capital is likely an imperfect substitute for 
education and experience obtained domestically due to international differences in curriculum, 
teacher quality, job training, and work tasks. The importance of understanding the value of 
foreign human capital is greater than ever as the share of foreign-born workers in the U.S. 
increases. Studies that consider human capital by the location where it was acquired typically 
find foreign human capital earns a lower return (Bratsberg and Ragan 2002; Chiswick 1978; 
Friedberg 2000; Schoeni 1997; Zeng and Xie 2004).  
While foreign human capital may be valued less than domestic human capital in general, 
it may not be true in all labor markets. More specifically, the foreign human capital penalty may 
be minimal in a field that requires specialized or technical training. A major limitation of 
previous research lies in its failure to consider differences across occupations. This study focuses 
on the returns to foreign human capital in the nursing occupation, which is of particular interest 
due to the reported shortage of nurses in the United States. Currently, there is a controversial 
debate on whether to import foreign nurses as a solution to the shortage problem. Proponents of 
foreign nurse recruiting believe patient health is threatened by the shortage of hospital nurses and 
that hiring trained nurses from other countries can relieve the nursing shortage and greatly 
benefit the general public. On the other hand, opponents argue foreign education in nursing may 
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be of inferior quality and foreign nurses with inadequate training will provide lower quality of 
patient care. Given the contentious policy debates on the relative quality of foreign nurses' 
training, it is important to examine the issue empirically.   
This study sheds new light on the portability of foreign education and experience by 
examining a specific labor market and using more precise information on foreign human capital. 
Using a nationally representative sample of registered nurses in the U.S., I find a small foreign 
education premium in nursing. The result contrasts with existing research and highlights the 
heterogeneity in the value of foreign human capital.  
II. The Returns to Foreign Education 
The finding of smaller returns on foreign human capital should arrive as no surprise. As 
outlined in Chiswick (1978) and Alboim et al. (2005), economic theory predicts foreign human 
capital will earn a lower return than domestic human capital due to a number of reasons. First, 
immigrants' unfamiliarity with the language and institutions of the U.S. will result in lower 
economic returns on their skills. Second, discrimination against immigrants in the labor market 
may contribute to lower value of foreign human capital. Third, the overall quality of foreign 
education may be lower on average. Finally, employers lack the information required to evaluate 
and fully remunerate foreign education and experience. A more recent study by Chiswick and 
Miller (2008) suggests the less-than-perfect transferability of foreign education may also be a 
result of mismatch between immigrants' skills and job requirements.   
Researchers often use the return on education for immigrants as a proxy for the return on 
foreign education. However, such measure is biased due to the fact that many immigrants have 
both foreign and domestic education. The value of foreign education will therefore be over-
estimated if foreign education commands a lower return than domestic education. In Chiswick's 
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early study (1978), the return to an additional year of education is 5.7 percent for immigrants and 
7.2 percent for natives. He also explores whether the lower return to education for immigrants is 
a result of lower return to education acquired before migration. The estimates show higher return 
to pre-migration education than post-migration education, which are contrary to expectations. 
However, his estimates may be biased because the definition of pre- and post-migration 
schooling, based on immigrants' age at arrival, may have substantial measurement errors.  
A few studies more accurately measure foreign education and typically find lower returns 
to foreign than domestic education. Schoeni (1997) reports that Mexican and Central American 
immigrants with only foreign education earn substantially less than their immigrant counterparts 
who obtained U.S. education. Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) use data from the U.S. censuses and 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to study the effects of domestic education on 
earnings. They show that immigrants who acquire U.S. schooling earn higher wages than other 
immigrants. Furthermore, returns to education are higher for immigrants from highly developed 
countries and countries in which English is an official language. Using the 1993 National Survey 
of College Graduates and 1990 census, Zeng and Xie (2004) demonstrate that Asian immigrants 
who received foreign education earned about 16 percent less than those who were U.S.-educated. 
An important question unaddressed by these papers is whether immigrants with domestic 
education are comparable to natives. Kim and Sakamoto (2010) fill this gap in the literature and 
illustrate that completing high school in the U.S. eliminates the foreign-born disadvantage for 
college-educated Asian men. 
While these studies are able to calculate the number of years of foreign education and 
experience accurately, the problem of neglecting heterogeneity in the labor market remains 
unresolved. The exiting literature on foreign human capital considers workers in the aggregate 
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labor market, even though education and experience in certain fields may be more transferable 
internationally. One exception in the extensive literature examines the returns to foreign 
education in a narrowly defined labor market. Focusing on college-educated scientists and 
engineers, Kaushal (2011) shows that having U.S. education boosts earnings of the foreign-born 
and helps close the immigrant-native earnings gap. 
 The labor market for nurses has attracted some recent attention. Two  papers examine the 
relative earnings of foreign-educated nurses (FEN) and find some evidence that FENs have 
higher annual and hourly wages than nurses educated in the U.S. (Arends-Kuenning 2006; Xu et 
al. 2010). These studies use simple mean comparisons and do not employ econometric analysis 
to explain the wage differential. Some of FENs’ earnings advantage may be explained by their 
higher likelihood of having a bachelor’s degree, working in hospitals, and residing in urban 
areas. Schumacher (2011) analyzes immigration and its wage effects in the U.S. labor market of 
nurses. Although the primary focus of his paper is to examine whether foreign-born nurses 
depress wages of competing natives, he also uses regressions to compare wages of foreign and 
native RNs. He finds little difference in wages of the two groups and that the increased supply of 
foreign RNs reduces wages of their native counterparts. It has to be stressed that the earnings 
differential documented in these studies is not equivalent to the returns on foreign nursing 
education because some foreign nurses obtained more education in the U.S. after migration. 
Failure to differentiate between nurses with only foreign education and foreign nurses with U.S. 
education will result in biased estimates of the returns to foreign education.   
 A distinct feature of the nursing occupation is its licensing requirement. In economic 
theory, occupational licensing is viewed as a way to restrict entry, reduce competition, and drive 
up the cost of labor (Friedman 1962). Proponents of occupational licensing argue the 
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requirement protects consumers by precluding incompetent practitioners from entering the 
occupation or by forcing less-competent practitioners to invest in human capital (Leland 1979; 
Shaked and Sutton 1981; Shapiro 1986). While the theory does not provide a clear prediction of 
the international transferability of human capital, it may decrease wage dispersion within the 
occupation and narrow the wage gap between the foreign- and U.S.-educated. From a different 
point of view, a U.S. nursing license may serve as a signal for foreign-educated nurses. 
Employers may have difficulties evaluating foreign degrees, but they can understand the 
qualifications of foreign nurses with a U.S. license. Occupational licensing could therefore imply 
that foreign education penalty would be minimal in nursing. 
 This essay contributes to the literature on the returns to foreign human capital in three 
key ways. First, the study takes into account the heterogeneity in the labor market by focusing on 
a specific occupation. Second, the dataset contains precise information on the location where 
human capital was acquired. This information allows me to distinguish between individuals with 
only foreign education and those with both U.S. and foreign education to avoid bias in the 
estimated returns on foreign education. Finally, important institutions in the labor market, 
including unions and occupational licensing, are examined. Altogether, this research addresses 
major limitations in existing studies and provides a more comprehensive analysis of the 
international transferability of human capital.  
 The next section discusses the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section IV 
describes the empirical methodologies and reports estimates of the returns on foreign human 
capital. The final section concludes with a summary and policy implications. 
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III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
A. National Sample Survey of Registered Nurses (NSSRN) 
 The sample is drawn from the NSSRN, which is conducted by Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
every four years since 1977. The NSSRN is a cross-sectional database that provides information 
on the number of the nation’s registered nurses, their educational background, their employment 
settings, position levels, patient types, and salaries. It also provides information on their 
geographic distribution and personal characteristics including gender, ethnic background, age, 
marital status, and children. The NSSRN population consists of all registered nurses who are 
currently eligible to practice as an RN in the United States. This includes RNs who have received 
a specialty license or have been certified by a State agency as an advanced practice nurse (APN) 
such as nurse practitioner, certified nurse midwife, certified registered nurse anesthetist, or 
clinical nursing specialist, but excludes lower-skilled licensed practical nurses (LPNs) and 
licensed vocational nurses (LVNs).   
 Relative to more commonly used datasets such as the decennial census and the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), the NSSRN has the advantage of containing detailed information on 
employer setting, nursing position, hospital unit, and type of patients. While these variables may 
appear to be irrelevant for workers outside of the healthcare sector, they are key determinants of 
nurses’ wages. In addition, the NSSRN provides the location of a respondent’s nursing 
education, starting in the year of 1988. Defining foreign nurses based on their nationality will 
yield an inaccurate analysis of the effect of foreign education, since some foreign-born nurses 
obtain their nursing education entirely in the United States. This study utilizes the 1988, 1992, 
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1996, 2000, and 2004 NSSRN to analyze the returns on foreign nursing education. For a more 
precise analysis, the sample is restricted to full-time workers with nonzero earnings. 
B. Construction of Variables 
 I measure education by the type of nursing degree rather than the total years of schooling 
for two reasons. First, the estimated return to education measured by years of schooling is likely 
biased due to the presence of sheepskin effects, or wage premium for degree recipients relative to 
individuals with the same years of schooling but have not completed the degree (Hungerford and 
Solon 1987; Jaeger and Page 1996). Second, nursing degrees are not consecutive as other 
academic degrees. There are three typical educational paths available to any high-school 
graduates planning on becoming a RN—a nursing diploma, an associate degree in nursing 
(ADN), and a bachelor's of science in nursing (BSN). Nursing diploma programs, administered 
in hospitals and sometimes in conjunction with community colleges, take about three years. 
ADN programs, offered by community colleges and focus more on technical skills than theory, 
take two to three years to complete. BSN programs are four-year programs offered by 
universities and colleges. Though licensed graduates of any of the three programs qualify for 
entry-level nursing jobs, advancement opportunities may be more limited for ADN and diploma 
holders. A bachelor's or higher degree is often required for administrative, research, consulting, 
and teaching positions.
1
 In order to account for the non-consecutive nature of nursing education 
and sheepskin effects, I allow wages of nurses to vary by the type of nursing degree rather than 
assuming wages increase with years of education.   
                                                             
1 Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2010-11 Edition.  
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 Based on the location of basic nursing education, years since graduation, and years since 
obtaining nursing license in the U.S., I define three types of nurses to examine the returns on 
foreign education:  
(1) Pure FEN: Basic nursing education from abroad; highest nursing degree completed 
before obtaining U.S. license. 
(2) Mixed FEN: Basic nursing education from abroad; highest nursing degree completed 
after obtaining U.S. license. 
(3) Pure U.S.-Educated Nurse (US-RN): Basic nursing education from U.S.2  
 A distinction must be made between FENs with and without U.S. education in order to 
precisely capture returns to foreign education. Otherwise foreign education penalty, if it exists, 
may be biased downward because some FENs also obtained U.S. education. Another measure of 
human capital, experience, may also be valued differently depending where it was acquired, 
therefore I allow the returns to foreign and domestic experience to differ in the empirical model. 
Years of potential foreign experience is calculated as the time between completing highest 
degree and obtaining a U.S. license for nurses with foreign education. Potential experience in the 
U.S. is defined as the number of years since obtaining a U.S. nursing license.
3 
 
C. Summary of Statistics  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for three types of nurses defined above in the 
pooled 1988-2004 NSSRN (Columns 1 to 3). I also test for significant difference between US-
RNs and nurses with foreign education (Columns 4 and 5). FENs, with and without domestic 
                                                             
2 I assume nurses with domestic basic education do not obtain advanced nursing degrees in a foreign country. The location of 
one's nursing degree obtained after basic education is not available in the data set.  
3 The definition implicitly assumes all nurses work continuously after their U.S. license is obtained and that FENs start working 
continuously upon graduation in their home country. 
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education, both earn higher salaries than U.S.-educated nurses on average. In terms of labor 
supply, FENs work fewer weeks and more hours, though the difference in hours is not 
statistically significant at 10 percent. Dividing annual salary by the product of work weeks and 
hours demonstrates FENs earn more per hour, which may be explained at least partially by the 
difference in various characteristics between FENs and US-RNs. There is a significant difference 
in the type of nursing degree FENs and US-RNs choose. More than 40 percent of FENs have a 
nursing diploma, while only 21 percent of US-RNs have a diploma. Nearly half of nurses with 
only foreign education hold a bachelor's degree in nursing. However, only 31 percent of US-RNs 
and 32 percent nurses with mixed education have a bachelor's degree. US-RNs are much more 
likely to receive an associate degree or a master's degree and beyond. Figure 1 graphs average 
real hourly wages by nursing degree type and shows a significant premium for having a 
bachelor's or higher degree. There is little difference between wages of diploma holders and 
associate degree recipients. It is unclear whether the distribution of FENs' highest degree alone 
explains their earnings advantage. 
 US-RNs are younger than nurses with only foreign education but older than nurses with 
mixed education. US-RNs have 13 years of experience, compared to pure FENs' 20 years and 
mixed FENs' 11 years of experience. The difference in experience may explain the earnings 
advantage of nurses with only foreign education, but it does not explain why mixed FENs also 
earn more than US-RNs. Across three subsamples, around 90 percent of nurses are women. US-
RNs are less (more) likely to be married and have children over age six than pure (mixed) FENs, 
perhaps due to their difference in age. As expected, there is a significant difference in the racial 
composition across subsamples of nurses. More than 90 percent of US-RNs are white, compared 
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to 22 percent of pure FENs and 62 percent mixed FENs. These demographic characteristics of 
nurses make them a unique labor market.  
 US-RNs and FENs also differ in their employer settings. While 61 percent of US-RNs 
work in a hospital setting, as many as 75 percent of FENs work at hospitals. Relative to US-RNs, 
pure FENs are more likely to work in a nursing home but less likely to be in any other employer 
settings. California is a popular destination for FENs. In fact, 24 percent of pure FENs and 20 
percent of mixed FENs are located in California. The other states in which FENs are likely to 
live include New York, New Jersey, Texas, and Florida. If these states pay higher wages, FENs 
will earn more on average. Figure 2 plots average real hourly wages by state and indicates 
California, New York, New Jersey, Texas, and Florida have higher wages than other states. The 
concentration of FENs in higher-paying states and the aforementioned covariates may explain 
why FENs earn more on average. Empirical analyses in the next section will formally examine 
the value of foreign and domestic human capital in nursing.      
IV. Empirical Analysis 
A. Theoretical Framework  
The human capital model provides the basis for empirical analysis in this study. The 
model assumes that wages are determined by an individual’s education, experience, and other 
demographic characteristics. The standard Mincer earnings equation is the follows:  
       
iiiii XEESw   4
2
321ln             (1) 
where iw  denotes wages of individual i, iS  is the individual’s years of schooling, and 
iE  is work experience. X contains a set of demographic characteristics. In order to compare the 
returns on foreign and domestic human capital, years of schooling can be divided into non-U.S. 
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and U.S. education. Similarly, work experience is made up of experience acquired from outside 
and from within the United States.  
B. Least-Squares Estimates of the Returns on Foreign Human Capital  
I begin the analysis by estimating the following modified Mincer equation with OLS:  
       ititit
itititiitit
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      (2) 
where itw  denotes real hourly wages of individual i in year t, which is derived from 
dividing annual salary by the product of weeks and usual hours worked per week. I use hourly 
wages rather than weekly wages and annual salary to ensure wages capture the difference in the 
labor supply of foreign- and U.S.-educated nurses.  
To more accurately estimate the value of foreign education, FENs are divided into two 
groups. PureFE is a dummy variable for nurses with only foreign education. Mixed is a dummy 
variable for nurses with both foreign and U.S. education. 1  measures the returns to foreign 
nursing education relative to U.S. education. 2  measures the returns to having both foreign and 
U.S. education relative to having only U.S. education. t  captures year fixed-effects. The vector
X  includes type of highest degree, and employer setting. Additional controls are gradually 
added to the baseline regression, including gender, marital status, children, race, nursing 
position, patient type, type of unit, located in a MSA, the state of employer, and in-MSA dummy 
interacted with states. The standard errors are robust and clustered on states.  
Table 2 displays estimates of the returns to foreign and domestic human capital in 
nursing. In the baseline model, which controls for education, experience, and employer setting, 
the return on having only foreign nursing education is 11.3 percent (column 1, row 1). The return 
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on having U.S. in addition to foreign education is 9.4 percent (column 1, row 2). These large 
coefficients may reflect the wage differential between races. When demographic variables are 
added to the regression, the returns on pure foreign and mixed education reduce to only 3.7 
percent and 6.1 percent, respectively (column 2, rows 1 and 2). Because the wages of nurses 
likely reflect the complexity of their jobs, the third specification further controls for 13 nursing 
positions, 11 unit types, and ten types of patients.
4
 The returns on foreign and mixed education 
increase slightly in magnitude (column 3, rows 1 and 2). Finally, in order to allow wages to vary 
by location, the full model includes dummy variables for states, being in a MSA, and in-MSA 
dummy interacted with states. The returns to purely foreign and mixed education both reduce to 
around 4 percent (column 4, rows 1 and 2). Taken together, the positive returns to foreign 
education reported in Table 2 contradict with theoretical models. Economic theory predicts 
foreign education commands a lower return due to immigrants' unfamiliarity with the language 
and institutions, discrimination against immigrants in the labor market, the overall quality of 
foreign education being lower, employers’ inability to evaluate foreign credentials, and a 
mismatch between immigrants' skills and job requirements.   
Consistent with existing studies and theoretical predictions, this analysis shows U.S. 
experience earns a higher return than foreign experience in the sample of nurses. Each year of 
U.S. experience increases nursing wages by 2 to 2.5 percent, whereas the return on foreign 
experience is less than one percent and not always statistically significant. The transferability of 
work experience from another country is often lower because many domestic employers have 
imperfect information on the job content and work tasks associated with a position title from 
abroad. Some employers may find it cumbersome to contact references who are located abroad. 
                                                             
4 Appendix 1 contains a complete list of positions, patient types, and units.  
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Furthermore, foreign applicants are disadvantaged if their recommendation letters are not written 
in proper English. Altogether, the estimates presented in Table 2 suggest foreign education is 
more transferable than foreign experience in nursing. The subsequent section aims to explain the 
counter-intuitive foreign education premium that is not found in the aggregate labor market.     
C. Potential Explanations  
 There are several potential factors that might explain the absence of foreign education 
penalty in nursing. First, FENs may be more responsive to economic incentives and may choose 
to work for the employers who pay the highest wages, given the high cost of migration. Second, 
FENs are likely to obtain degrees with the greatest returns, following the same logic. Third, 
many FENs come from English-speaking countries and received training in English. Due to its 
technical nature, nursing education could be similar across countries, including non-English 
speaking nations. Fourth, the Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing Schools (CGFNS) 
exam required of foreign nurses might have prevented lower quality FENs from entering the U.S. 
labor market. I evaluate these potential explanatory factors through analysis for various 
subsamples.   
 1. FENs are more concentrated in hospitals  
Table 1 indicates FENs are much more likely to work in a hospital setting, therefore on 
average FEN may have an earnings advantage if hospitals pay higher wages. Figure 3 presents 
mean hourly wages in six work settings and demonstrates hospitals are not the highest paying 
nursing employer. Wages are actually the highest in nursing education, which employs very few 
FENs. The figure suggests the foreign education premium is probably not simply a result of 
FENs being concentrated in high-paying employer settings.  
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While wages are not the highest in hospitals, the value of foreign education may be 
higher in hospitals than in other settings. After all, it is rational for FENs to work in a place 
where their education is valued the most. Next I examine the foreign education premium in more 
detail by estimating equation (2) separately for each of the six employer settings. Each regression 
controls for a full set of variables as in the 4
th
 specification in Table 2, including types of nursing 
degree, domestic and foreign experience, squared terms of experience, dummies for gender, race, 
marital status, children, position, unit, patient types, located in MSA, and states. Table 3 presents 
the estimates and shows foreign education premium only exists in a hospital setting (column 1). 
More specifically, the returns on pure foreign and mixed education in hospitals are 3.7 percent 
and 5.2 percent, respectively. The foreign education premium is higher in hospitals than in the 
overall nursing labor market. These estimates suggest the positive returns on foreign nursing 
education are at least partially driven by the foreign education premium in hospitals. Unlike the 
aggregate labor market, there is no foreign education penalty in the other five employer settings 
(columns 2 to 6). 
Why would foreign education be valued more in hospitals? The H-1C visa created by the 
Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act in 1999 ensures foreign nurses are employed in 
areas with nursing shortages. Relative to domestic hospital nurses, foreign-trained hospital 
nurses may be more likely to work in cities with shortages, where recruiters are willing to pay 
higher wages to attract qualified nurses from abroad. Immigration opponents often argue U.S. 
employers hire foreign workers at lower wages, causing native workers to lose their wages or 
jobs. In a time when the U.S. faces a severe shortage of hospital nurses, positive estimates of the 
returns to foreign education in this analysis provide evidence against the notion that foreign 
nurses are hired because they are "cheap labor".  
74 
 
 2. FENs are more likely to have a bachelor's degree  
 Since nurses with only foreign education are much more likely to have a bachelor’s 
degree, the overall foreign education premium could reflect the hourly wage advantage of BSNs 
relative to diploma and associate degree recipients, ranging from one to two dollars (Figure 1). 
However, the matter is further complicated by the fact that a larger share of US-RNs hold a 
master’s or higher degree, compared to FENs (Table 1). As illustrated in Figure 1, nurses with 
advanced degrees earn 6.8 dollars more per hour than BSNs. US-RNs with graduate degrees may 
offset FENs’ earnings advantage from holding a bachelor’s degree. Therefore it is not 
immediately obvious whether the foreign education premium can be explained by the difference 
in educational background between US-RNs and FENs.   
Nevertheless, certain types of nursing degrees from abroad may earn a higher return than 
others in the U.S. market. To test this hypothesis, I estimate the returns on foreign education for 
each of the four nursing degrees—diploma, associate, bachelor’s, and master’s and above. Table 
4 contains the estimates. The coefficient on pure foreign education is not significantly different 
from zero in any subsample, implying a foreign degree in nursing is comparable to a domestic 
degree in the U.S. labor market. On the other hand, mixed FENs whose highest degree is a 
diploma earn 3.3 more than similarly-educated US-RNs. Mixed FENs with associate degrees 
earn a 7.3 percent premium relative to US-RNs. There is no mixed foreign education premium 
among nurses with a bachelor’s or higher degree. It is worth mentioning that the smaller sample 
size of mixed FENs in these subsamples may lead to less precise estimates of the returns on 
mixed nursing education.  
The positive returns on mixed foreign and domestic education in Table 4 support the 
immigrant human capital investment (IHCI) model introduced by Duleep and Regets (1999, 
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2002). The IHCI model formalizes the theory of human capital transferability discussed in 
Chiswick (1978) by including a parameter that captures the proportion of source-country human 
capital valued in the destination labor market. One of the implications of this model is that even 
skills acquired abroad that are not valued in the destination country’s labor market are still useful 
to the acquisition of new skills. Nurses who obtained basic education abroad may therefore find 
it easier to learn new techniques in the U.S. than native nurses with no previous training. 
Education from abroad likely gives FENs an advantage over domestic nurses in U.S. nursing 
schools and result in higher earnings. It is expected that FENs with domestic human capital will 
earn more than the purely foreign-educated due to their enhanced knowledge of U.S. institutions, 
language, and culture.  
The fact that BSNs earn less than nurses with advanced degrees and that FENs are less 
likely to have advanced degrees, along with the absent of foreign education premium among 
BSNs, suggest the overall foreign education premium in nursing is not a result of FENs being 
more likely to hold a bachelor’s degree.  
 3. FENs are more likely to be from English-Speaking Countries 
It is well-documented that proficiency in the destination language increases immigrants’ 
earnings. Foreign nurses likely have a higher level of English proficiency than average 
immigrants since 85 percent of FENs grew up in English-speaking countries.
5
 Additionally, the 
transferability of human capital for foreign nurses is likely higher than that for other immigrant 
workers because courses are usually taught in the official language of the country. Therefore it is 
expected that foreign nurses educated in English-speaking countries have highly transferable 
                                                             
5 The figure comes from author's calculation based on the pooled 1988-2004 NSSRN. The Philippines is the largest sending 
country of FENs. In general, immigrants in the U.S. are not as likely to be from English-speaking nations, since Mexico is the 
largest immigrant-sending country.  
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human capital. The NSSRN contains information on the country in which an individual obtained 
his or her basic nursing education, which allows me to split FENs into English and non-English 
speaking samples. Based on the official language, English-speaking countries in this analysis 
include Canada, U.K., Australia, New Zealand, India, Hong Kong, Pakistan, and the Philippines.  
To compare the portability of education from English and non-English speaking 
countries, I estimate the returns on foreign education separately for English and non-English 
speaking countries. Table 5 displays the estimates and indicates the return to foreign education is 
positive for nurses trained in English speaking nations but insignificant for FENs from non-
English speaking nations. Specifically, the purely foreign-educated from English speaking 
nations earn a 3.4 percent premium. Having additional domestic education increases wages of 
FENs from English speaking countries by 4.7 percent. Given that the literature typically shows 
low transferability of human capital from non-English speaking nations, it is unexpected to find 
foreign nurses from countries with an official language other than English experience no wage 
penalty. These estimates confirm the labor market of nurses is unique and suggest the foreign 
education premium in nursing can be largely explained by positive returns on foreign education 
from English speaking countries.  
D. Sensitivity Analysis  
 1. Overtime Pay  
This section examines the robustness of the estimates with respect to overtime pay. 
Because overtime hours are paid at a higher wage rate, hourly wages may be higher for FENs if 
they work more overtime. As mentioned earlier, hourly wages are constructed by dividing annual 
salary by the product of weeks and usual hours worked. The survey asks how many hours a 
respondent is scheduled to work during a week, including on-cal duty and overtime hours. 
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Starting in 2004, the NSSRN includes new questions about required and voluntary overtime 
hours. Table 6 contains average mandatory and voluntary overtime hours worked by US-RNs 
and FENs and demonstrates FENs work more overtime hours than US-RNs, even though US-
RNs have more mandatory overtime hours. US-RNs are required to work 0.71 overtime hour per 
week, compared to 0.66 and 0.49 among the pure and mixed FENs, respectively. The purely 
foreign educated work 2.5 hours of overtime voluntarily, which is more than 1.58 hours among 
mixed FENs and 1.26 hours among US-RNs. It is not surprising that FENs work more voluntary 
overtime hours given that a high percentage of foreign nurses regularly send money to families 
in their home country (Buchan 2006). Nonetheless, the estimated returns on foreign nursing 
education may be upward biased if the difference in overtime hours worked by FENs and US-
RNs is not taken into account.  
Next I test the sensitivity in the estimates by excluding overtime workers. This robustness 
check is based only on the data in 2004, which was the first year when the information on 
overtime hours became available. I estimate the returns to foreign education using the full 2004 
NSSRN and its two sub-samples—nurses who worked no voluntary overtime hours and those 
who worked no overtime hours at all. Each regression controls for work settings, types of 
nursing degree, domestic and foreign experience, squared terms of experience, dummies for 
gender, race, marital status, children, position, unit, patient types, located in MSA, and states. 
Column 1 of Table 7 contains estimates of the returns to foreign nursing education in 
2004. Contrasting with estimates based on the 1988-2004 data, the foreign-educated do not earn 
a premium in the 2004 NSSRN. Eliminating nurses who worked voluntary overtime hours 
reduces the sample size from 17,755 to 14,735, though the returns on foreign and mixed nursing 
education remain statistically insignificant (column 2). Restricting the sample to nurses with no 
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overtime hours reduces the number of observations by another 1,695 and has no effect on the 
significance of the returns to foreign and mixed education (column 3). This robustness check 
confirms there is no foreign education penalty in nursing and the estimates are not sensitive to 
the inclusion of overtime workers.  
It is worth noting that due to the limitation of the NSSRN, this analysis cannot capture 
the wage premium associated with working night shifts. If FENs are more likely to work night 
shifts, their average hourly wage will be higher than that of US-RNs. Another sensitivity analysis 
is needed to examine whether the foreign education premium is robust to day-night shift 
differential. It would be of interest for future research in the area to distinguish between day and 
night shifts when comparing wages of US-RNs and FENs.  
 2. Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market  
The nursing occupation is unique due to its highly unionized nature. Theoretically, unions 
can bargain for wages above the equilibrium level; empirically, union members receive higher 
wages than their non-unionized counterparts. Therefore, FENs may have an overall advantage if 
they are more likely to join unions. Because the question about unionization was first asked in 
2004, the sample in this part of the analysis is drawn from the 2004 NSSRN. Table 8 contains 
unionization rates for foreign- and U.S.-educated nurses and indicates pure FENs are notably 
more likely than other nurses to join a union. The unionization differential between FENs and 
US-RNs may reflect findings in existing studies that FENs are more concentrated in urban areas, 
where union representation is more prevalent than in rural areas (Xu et al. 2010).  
While the literature does not discuss the effect of unions on the relative value of foreign 
nursing education, it is predicted that unions would compress wage differentials within a sector. 
Unions may therefore reduce the gap between the returns on foreign and domestic nursing 
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education. Although state dummies are included to capture the interstate wage differences, such 
as those caused by different levels of unionization, it is worth investigating whether the power of 
unions affects the relative return on foreign education.  
To examine the impact of unions on the returns on foreign nursing education, I split the 
sample into Right to Work (RTW) and non-Right to Work states and include a dummy variable 
for individual union status. Theoretically, the differential between the returns on foreign and 
domestic education should be smaller in non-RTW states because of higher union presence. 
Table 9 presents returns on foreign education in RTW and non-RTW states and does not support 
the theoretical prediction, since the returns on foreign education are insignificant in both samples 
(Rows 1 and 2). The estimates imply unions do not play a significant role in compressing the 
wage differential between FENs and US-RNs. As expected, union members receive a wage 
premium, ranging from 4.3 to 5.3 percent (Row 3). The similarity between FEN premium in 
RTW and non-RTW states suggests the overall FEN premium between 1988 and 2004 is likely 
not driven by FENs' higher rates of unionization.  
Another factor that may contribute to imperfect competition in the nursing occupation is 
the presence of monopsony. The market for hospital nurses is a common textbook example of 
monopsony. Specifically, it is argued that hospitals possess monopsonist power over nurses and 
set the wages at sub-competitive levels. Empirical results on monopsony, however, are mixed at 
best. On the one hand, small estimates of RN labor supply elasticities facing hospitals imply the 
existence of a significant level of monopsony power in the nursing market (Staiger et al. 2010; 
Sullivan 1989). On the other hand, some studies find hospital concentration does not affect 
nursing wages and conclude there is no evidence supporting the classic monopsony model 
(Adamache and Sloan 1982; Hirsch and Schumacher 2005). Nevertheless, these studies do not 
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examine whether monopsony plays a role in relative returns on foreign nursing education. If 
FENs are willing to work for lower wages than US-RNs, hospitals' monopsony power could be 
strengthened. Since empirical estimates presented in this study do not suggest FENs taking lower 
wages, monopsony should have little or no impact on FENs' relative wages. Furthermore, given 
that unionization is potentially a strong countervailing force to the monopsony powers exercised 
by hospitals, imperfect competition likely has limited effect on estimates in this study (Link and 
Landon 1975).  
V. Conclusion 
 This empirical research analyzes the returns to foreign human capital in nursing using a 
national survey of nurses. While existing literature on immigrant assimilation and human capital 
shows foreign education earns a lower return than domestic education in the full U.S. labor 
market, this study finds different and unexpected results in the occupation of nursing. The 
occupation is of particular interest as the U.S. faces a growing shortage of nurses. Understanding 
the transferability of foreign education in nursing can help evaluate recruiting FENs as a 
potential strategy to address the shortage. Based on the 1988-2004 NSSRN, I find a small foreign 
education premium, which contrasts with theoretical predictions and much of the existing 
literature. The result suggests FENs and US-RNs are viewed as substitutes by employers. More 
in-depth analysis reveals the foreign education premium in nursing can largely be explained by 
the high share of FENs from English-speaking countries. FENs working in areas with severe 
shortages and the specialized nature of nursing also contribute to the foreign nursing education 
premium.  
 In terms of implications for the literature, this study calls for caution when making 
generalizations about the transferability of foreign education. Future research on foreign human 
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capital should take into account the heterogeneity in the labor market. In addition, the estimates 
suggest that foreign education penalty in occupations with licensing requirements should be 
minimal. It would be of interest to investigate the international transferability of human capital in 
similar occupations, such as physicians, medical technicians, and physical therapists.  
The research also generates important immigration and educational policy implications 
for the United States. The estimates provide evidence against the notion that immigrants are 
"cheap labor". At least in the labor market of nurses, the foreign-educated are not paid less than 
their native counterparts. Provided that foreign nursing education is highly transferable, 
recruiting FENs using temporary work visas may be one way of addressing the shortage in the 
short run. It should be emphasized that there are ethical concerns regarding recruiting nurses 
from developing countries that also experience a nursing shortage. The effect of FENs on native 
nurses’ employment opportunities and career advancement, rather than wages, remains to be 
examined. Another solution is to increase funding for nursing education and encourage domestic 
students to enter the field. Furthermore, it will be helpful to draft policies to improve the hospital 
work environment and retain nurses in the long run.  
An important issue beyond the scope of this essay concerns the effect of hiring nurses 
from abroad on the quality of domestic patient care. In order to fully understand the impact of 
foreign nurses on the U.S. healthcare system, future studies should investigate whether the 
increased presence of foreign-trained nurses directly affects patient outcomes, such as mortality 
and infections.    
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Figure 1   
Mean Hourly Wage by Highest Nursing Degree Type 
(1988-2004 NSSRN) 
 
Note: Weighted by survey sampling weights. 
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Figure 2   
Mean Hourly Wage by State  
(1988-2004 NSSRN) 
 
Note: Weighted by survey sampling weights. 
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Figure 3   
Mean Hourly Wage by Employer Setting  
(1988-2004 NSSRN)  
 
Note: Weighted by survey sampling weights. 
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Table 1   
Descriptive Statistics 
(1988-2004 NSSRN)  
Variable 
Purely 
U.S.-
Educated 
Nurses 
(US-RN) 
Purely 
Foreign-
Educated 
Nurses 
(Pure FEN) 
Nurses with 
Mixed 
Foreign/U.S. 
Education 
(Mixed FEN) 
Difference between 
Purely U.S. and 
Purely Foreign 
Education 
(p-value) 
Difference between 
Purely U.S. and 
Mixed Education 
(p-value) 
Real Annual Salary 45,648.7 50,142.3 47,812.2 0.000 0.017 
(in 2000 dollars) [67.80] [332.52] [904.20]   
Real Hourly Wage 23.055 26.650 25.963 0.000 0.029 
(in 2000 dollars)  [0.086] [0.466] [1.330]   
Hours Worked 40.802 41.102 41.115 0.181 0.578 
 [0.032] [0.222] [0.561]   
Weeks Worked 50.508 49.669 49.403 0.000 0.014 
 [0.017] [0.127] [0.448]   
Highest Degree = Diploma 0.213 0.423 0.505 0.000 0.000 
 [0.002] [0.012] [0.032]   
Highest Degree = Bachelor's 0.313 0.482 0.323 0.000 0.745 
 [0.002] [0.012] [0.030]   
Highest Degree = Associate 0.366 0.072 0.103 0.000 0.000 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.019]   
Highest Degree = Master's + 0.108 0.023 0.069 0.000 0.017 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.016]   
Age  41.996 42.948 38.088 0.000 0.000 
 [0.044] [0.231] [0.679]   
Potential Experience 12.793 19.744 10.876 0.000 0.002 
 [0.045] [0.218] [0.621]   
Experience in U.S. 12.992 11.069 11.373 0.000 0.009 
 [0.038] [0.167] [0.615]   
Female 0.936 0.924 0.889 0.057 0.016 
 [0.001] [0.006] [0.019]   
Married 0.657 0.729 0.600 0.000 0.073 
 [0.002] [0.010] [0.032]   
Have children under age 6 0.149 0.217 0.207 0.000 0.030 
 [0.001] [0.010] [0.026]   
Have children over age 6 0.432 0.495 0.298 0.000 0.000 
 [0.002] [0.012] [0.029]   
White 0.906 0.216 0.620 0.000 0.000 
 [0.001] [0.009] [0.032]   
Asian 0.011 0.672 0.282 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.011] [0.030]   
Hispanic 0.018 0.025 0.040 0.089 0.112 
 [0.001] [0.004] [0.013]   
Black 0.052 0.071 0.051 0.002 0.911 
 [0.001] [0.006] [0.013]   
Other race 0.013 0.016 0.008 0.246 0.468 
 [0.000] [0.003] [0.006]   
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Table 1  (Continued) 
Work Setting:      
Hospital 0.613 0.752 0.743 0.000 0.000 
 [0.002] [0.010] [0.028]   
Nursing Home 0.070 0.105 0.086 0.000 0.392 
 [0.001] [0.007] [0.019]   
Nursing Education 0.023 0.014 0.009 0.001 0.013 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.006]   
Public Health 0.114 0.047 0.052 0.000 0.000 
 [0.001] [0.005] [0.014]   
Student/Occupational Health 0.046 0.009 0.007 0.000 0.000 
 [0.001] [0.002] [0.004]   
Ambulatory Care/Insurance/ 
Licensing Agency 
0.134 0.073 0.102 0.000 0.100 
[0.001] [0.006] [0.019]   
Location:      
California 0.075 0.242 0.196 0.000 0.000 
 [0.001] [0.011] [0.027]   
New York 0.074 0.168 0.084 0.000 0.594 
 [0.001] [0.009] [0.019]   
New Jersey 0.028 0.075 0.039 0.000 0.419 
 [0.001] [0.006] [0.013]   
Texas 0.062 0.098 0.133 0.000 0.002 
 [0.001] [0.007] [0.023]   
Florida 0.057 0.102 0.105 0.000 0.022 
 [0.001] [0.008] [0.021]   
Other States 0.704 0.315 0.443 0.000 0.000 
 [0.002] [0.010] [0.031]   
Observations 84,234 2,477 352   
Note: Weighted by survey sampling weights. Linearized standard errors in brackets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
Table 2 
Returns on Foreign Human Capital in Nursing  
(1988-2004 NSSRN) 
  Log Real Hourly Wages 
VARIABLES\SPECIFICATION (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pure Foreign Education 0.113*** 0.037* 0.043** 0.036** 
 (0.030) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) 
Mixed Foreign & U.S. Education 0.094*** 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.039** 
 (0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) 
U.S. Experience 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Foreign Experience 0.006* 0.007* 0.007* 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Additional Controls 
    Gender, Race, Married, Children 
 
x x x 
Position, Unit, Patient Types  
 
 
x x 
MSA, States, MSA x States 
 
  
x 
Observations 87,063 87,063 87,063 87,063 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Each regression includes controls for types of nursing degree, squared terms of U.S. and foreign 
experience, and work settings. 
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Table 3   
Returns on Foreign Nursing Education by Employer Setting  
(1988-2004 NSSRN) 
 Log Real Hourly Wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES\SAMPLE Hospital 
Nursing 
Home 
Nursing 
Education 
Public 
Health 
Student/ 
Occupational 
Health 
Ambulatory 
Care/ Licensing/ 
Insurance agency 
Pure Foreign 0.037* 0.012 -0.178 -0.001 -0.041 -0.011 
Education (0.020) (0.043) (0.159) (0.052) (0.157) (0.050) 
Mixed Foreign & U.S. 0.052** -0.019 0.050 0.038 -0.000 -0.007 
Education (0.020) (0.085) (0.095) (0.047) (0.082) (0.035) 
Observations 54,083 6,269 2,143 9,465 3,782 11,321 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Each regression includes controls for types of nursing degree, squared terms of experience, gender, race, marital status, children, 
position, unit, patient types, in MSA, states, and in-MSA dummy interacted with states. 
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Table 4   
Returns on Foreign Nursing Education by Degree Type  
(1988-2004 NSSRN) 
  Log Real Hourly Wages 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES\SAMPLE Diploma Associate Bachelor's Master's + 
Pure Foreign Education 0.023 0.101 0.011 -0.099 
 
(0.021) (0.068) (0.031) (0.093) 
Mixed Foreign & U.S. Education 0.033* 0.073* 0.029 -0.056 
 (0.019) (0.037) (0.034) (0.107) 
Observations 19,232 30,581 28,151 9,099 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Each regression includes controls for types of nursing degree, squared terms of experience, gender, 
race, marital status, children, position, unit, patient types, in MSA, states, and in-MSA dummy interacted with states. 
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Table 5   
Returns on Foreign Nursing Education by Official Language 
(1988-2004 NSSRN) 
  Log Real Hourly Wage 
 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES\SAMPLE English-Speaking Non English-Speaking 
Pure Foreign Education 0.034* 0.039 
 (0.017) (0.037) 
Mixed Foreign & U.S. Education 0.047** 0.004 
 (0.019) (0.036) 
Observations 86,650 84,647 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. Each regression includes controls for types of nursing degree, squared terms 
of experience, gender, race, marital status, children, position, unit, patient types, in MSA, states, and in-
MSA dummy interacted with states. 
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Table 6  
Average Overtime Worked by Foreign- and U.S.-Educated Nurses 
(2004 NSSRN) 
 Total Overtime 
Hours/Week 
Required Overtime 
Hours/Week 
Voluntary Overtime 
Hours/Week 
U.S.-Educated (N = 17,209) 1.97 0.71 1.26 
Foreign-Educated (N = 439) 3.16 0.66 2.50 
Foreign- and U.S.- Educated (N = 107) 2.07 0.49 1.58 
Note: Weighted by survey sampling weights. Sample excludes individuals with invalid overtime hours.  
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Table 7  
Effect of Overtime on Returns to Foreign Nursing Education 
(2004 NSSRN) 
 
Log Real Hourly Wage 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES\SAMPLE 
Full Worked Zero 
Voluntary OT Hours 
Worked Zero OT 
Hours 
Pure Foreign Education -0.004 -0.026 -0.044 
 (0.042) (0.045) (0.049) 
Mixed Foreign & U.S. Education 0.047 0.019 0.017 
 (0.036) (0.041) (0.045) 
Observations 17,755 14,735 13,040 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. Each regression includes controls for types of nursing degree, squared terms of experience, gender, race, marital 
status, children, position, unit, patient types, in MSA, states, and in-MSA dummy interacted with states. 
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Table 8  
Rate of Unionization by Foreign- and U.S.-Educated Nurses 
(2004 NSSRN) 
 Represented by a 
Labor Union 
Not Represented by a 
Labor Union 
U.S.-Educated (N = 17,166) 15.3% 84.7% 
Foreign-Educated (N = 433) 31.8% 68.2% 
Foreign- and U.S.- Educated (N = 107) 15.8% 84.2% 
Note: Weighted by survey sampling weights. Sample excludes individuals with invalid responses to 
unionization. 
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Table 9  
Effect of Unions on Returns to Foreign Nursing Education 
(2004 NSSRN) 
 
  Log Real Hourly Wage 
 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES\SAMPLE Right-to-Work States Non Right-to-Work States 
Pure Foreign Education -0.040 0.025 
 (0.061) (0.050) 
Mixed Foreign & U.S. Education 0.045 0.051 
 
(0.050) (0.050) 
Represented by Union 0.043** 0.053*** 
 (0.017) (0.011) 
Observations 7,915 9,791 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on states in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. Each regression includes controls for types of nursing degree, squared terms 
of experience, gender, race, marital status, children, position, unit, patient types, in MSA, states, and in-
MSA dummy interacted with states. 
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Appendix 1  
Positions, Units, and Patient Types 
 Position Unit Patient Type 
1 Head Nurse Intensive Care Chronic 
2 Staff/General Duty Emergency Coronary Care 
3 Supervisor Home Health Care Neurological 
4 Instructor Hospice Newborn 
5 Administrator Labor/Delivery Obstetrics/Gynecologic 
6 Consultant Operating Room Orthopedic 
7 Practitioner/Midwife Outpatient Pediatric 
8 Clinical Specialist (CNS) General/Specialty Psychiatric 
9 Nurse Clinician Post Anesthesia Recovery Medical-Surgical 
10 Nurse Anesthetist (CRNA) Other Multiple Types or Other 
11 Research Multiple Units  
12 Private Duty   
13 Other   
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CHAPTER 4 
Education and Risk-Aversion in Immigrant-Native  
Health Insurance Disparities 
I. Introduction  
It is well-documented that immigrants throughout the United States are significantly less 
likely to have health insurance than their native-born counterparts (Derose et al. 2009; Ku and 
Matani 2001; Lee and Choi 2009). There is little disagreement that the uninsured population, 
regardless of nativity, places great financial burden on the U.S. health care system. Nonetheless, 
the 2009 policy change that lifted the five-year waiting period for legal permanent residents to 
qualify for federally-supported Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) still 
stirred contentious debates.1 Previous research has either treated immigrants as a homogenous 
group or focused on the low-skilled population. Given that highly-educated immigrants are 
typically legal, proficient in English, and more likely to hold graduate degrees than their native-
counterparts, one would expect there be no gap between well-educated immigrants and natives. 
Yet, college-educated immigrants are estimated to be twice as likely as natives to be uninsured 
(Center for Immigration Studies 2009). This study profiles a group of individuals that have been 
overlooked—highly-educated immigrants—by examining the immigrant-native insurance 
disparities for different education levels.  
An important determinant of insurance demand often omitted in the analyses is the 
degree of risk aversion (Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000). Even studies that take risk into account 
generally include the entire population and ignore the difference in the level of risk tolerance 
between well-educated and less-educated individuals. Research has suggested highly-educated 
individuals are less risk-averse than the less educated (Rosen et. al 2003; Orrenius and Zavodny 
                                                            
1 Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) of 2009. 
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2009). This research aims to examine whether risk-aversion plays a different role in health 
insurance coverage for the highly-educated and less-educated populations. 
Using the pooled 1998-2006 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), I estimate a 
series of probit regressions to compare the immigrant-native differential in uninsured rates for 
two education levels, controlling for risk preference, demographic characteristics, employment, 
income, and health status. In addition to current insurance status, I also evaluate the differential 
in take-up rates for individuals who have health insurance available at work.  
II. Literature  
 
 A large body of literature illustrates that immigrants on average are more likely to be 
uninsured than natives, although differences in the magnitude and contributing factors exist 
between subpopulations.2 Researchers and public officials have given considerable attention to 
obviously vulnerable populations, including ethnic minorities, children, elderly, recent arrivals, 
less-educated, and the undocumented (Alegría et al. 2006; Angel, Frias, and Hill 2005; Callahan, 
Hickson, and Cooper 2006; Choi 2006; Guendelman et al. 2005; Huang, Yu, and Ledsky 2006; 
Kincheloe, Frates, and Brown 2007; Lucas, Barr-Anderson, and Kington 2003; Prentice, Pebley, 
and Sastry 2005; Shah and Carrasquillo 2006; Yu et al. 2006; Yu et al. 2004). In contrast, 
college-educated immigrants have largely been overlooked in health policy research. It is not 
surprising that the well-educated receive so little attention, since higher education improves 
one’s ability to seek full-time jobs with more comprehensive health benefits. Nevertheless, 
highly-educated immigrants face some of the same barriers as the less-educated ones, such as 
limited access to government-sponsored programs. By analyzing the insurance disparity for 
                                                            
2 See Derose et al. (2009) for a comprehensive review. 
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highly-educated as well as less-educated individuals, this research paints a more complete 
picture of the nation’s uninsured population.  
 A crucial determinant of the demand for health insurance is an individual’s degree of 
risk-aversion. However, most empirical studies do not include such measure due to the lack of 
data. There is an extensive literature on the relationship between risk and health insurance 
coverage. The classic adverse selection model by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) predicts a 
positive correlation between risk and coverage, where high-risk individuals purchase full 
insurance and low-risk individuals purchase partial insurance. Yet, empirical research on adverse 
selection in health insurance markets is inconclusive (Cardon and Hendel 2001; Fang, Keane and 
Silverman 2008; Finkelstein and Poterba 2004; Hurd and McGarry 1997). Alternative models 
proposed by de Meza and Webb (2001) and Hemenway (1990) show an advantageous selection 
equilibrium can prevail if risk-averse individuals also engage in precautionary activities to lower 
their risk of suffering losses. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) point out the importance of 
considering the various features of insurance contracts. They find no evidence of adverse 
selection on the amount of payment in the event that the insured risk occurs, but there is strong 
evidence of adverse selection along other dimensions of the insurance contract. 
 While economic theory provides no clear prediction on immigrants' relative risk 
preferences, immigrants are often perceived to be risk takers due to the high risks associated with 
international migration. Empirical studies, however, have not reached a consensus on whether 
immigrants are less risk-averse. Orrenius and Zavodny (2009) find that immigrants are more 
concentrated in risky jobs, defined as occupations with high injury and fatality rates, than their 
native counterparts. On the other hand, Bonin et al. (2009) illustrate that immigrants in Germany 
are generally less willing to take risks than the native population. This analysis will examine how 
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immigrants compare with natives in terms of risk attitude, measured by risk-taking behaviors in 
health, and whether risk plays a different role in health insurance coverage for individuals of 
different education levels. 
Another important predictor of the demand for health insurance is an individual’s health 
status. Several studies find immigrants are positively selected in terms of health and have more 
favorable health outcomes than their native counterparts (Frisbie, Cho, and Hummer 2001; 
Lucas, Barr-Anderson, and Kington 2003; Singh and Yu 1996; Stephen et al. 1994; Wei et al. 
1996). The phenomenon is also known as the “healthy immigrant effect”. Because of their health 
status, immigrants may choose not to purchase insurance. This study will examine if the “healthy 
immigrant effect” exists and incorporate health status in the covariates when analyzing the 
immigrant-native insurance disparity.  
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This research utilizes data from the 1998-2006 waves of the NHIS.3 The NHIS is a 
nationally representative annual survey of the non-institutionalized population residing in the 
United States. The survey excludes patients in long-term care facilities, persons on active duty 
with the Armed Forces, persons incarcerated in the prison system, and U.S. nationals living in 
foreign countries. A major strength of this survey lies in the ability to contain information on the 
type of health insurance, access to care, health status, as well as a rich set of demographic 
socioeconomic variables. In contrast, the commonly used Current Population Survey (CPS) 
includes only health insurance status but does not indicate whether an individual works for a firm 
that provides insurance coverage. Because immigrants are less likely to work for employers that 
offer health insurance, the analysis should control for the availability of employer-sponsored 
                                                            
3 Available from the Minnesota Population Center and State Health Access Data Assistance Center at http://www.ihis.us.  
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health insurance. I choose the starting year of 1998 since that is the year in which an uninsured 
indicator first became available in the NHIS. Due to the nearly universal coverage of Medicare 
among the elderly, the analysis is restricted to individuals under the age of 65.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of insurance status, risky behavior, and selected 
socio-demographic variables by education level and nativity in the pooled 1998-2006 NHIS. 
Columns 1 and 2 display means for natives and immigrants with less than college education, 
whereas Columns 3 and 4 contain characteristics of natives and immigrants in the college-
educated population. In the less-educated sample, immigrants are more than twice as likely to be 
uninsured than their native counterparts. In fact, 40 percent of less-educated immigrants reported 
to be currently uninsured. Immigrants are also much less likely to have private insurance. A few 
socio-demographic characteristics stand out from the table. Immigrants are younger, more likely 
to be married, have a larger size of family and lower family income, more likely to be Hispanic 
or Asian, and employed by private companies. There is some evidence of healthy immigrant 
effect in the less-than-college sample, since immigrants are more likely to report being in 
excellent health.  
Foreign-born persons represent 13.3 percent of the non-elderly college-educated sample. 
Consistent with findings in previous studies, immigrants are much more likely to be uninsured. 
More precisely, 13.2 percent of college-educated immigrants have no health insurance, compared 
to only 6.2 percent of natives. In addition, immigrants are less likely to have private insurance. 
Immigrants are more likely than natives to be unemployed, outside of the labor force, less likely 
to work for the government, and have lower family income. The aforementioned factors may 
contribute to college-educated immigrants’ lower rate of insurance. Contrary to existing 
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literature, the “healthy immigrant effect” is not evident in the this population. The descriptive 
statistics indicate immigrants are less likely to report having very good or excellent health status.  
Contrary to common perception, the table reveals some evidence that immigrants are less 
risk-loving, measured by health risk behaviors. In the less-educated sample, immigrants are more 
risk-averse than natives, since they are less likely to smoke and drink heavily. On the other hand, 
college-educated immigrants are less risk-loving in terms of heavy drinking, but are similar to 
their native counterparts in terms of smoking. Additionally, Table 1 demonstrates that college-
educated and less-educated immigrants have distinct characteristics. For instance, college-
educated immigrants are much more likely than less-educated immigrants to be white or Asian, 
work for the government, have higher family income, and report being in good health (Columns 
2 and 4). Given these differences, it is more appropriate to examine the immigrant-native 
insurance gap separately in the college-educated and less-than-college populations. The next 
section describes the health insurance purchase decision and analyzes the immigrant-native 
disparity in health insurance using a series of probit regressions.  
IV. Empirical Analysis 
A. Decision to Purchase Health Insurance 
 Figure 1 presents a decision tree for individuals, starting with the decision of whether or 
not to work. Once an individual chooses to work, he or she can decide between working for a 
firm and self-employment. Next, the individual who is not self-employed may choose whether or 
not to work for a firm that provides insurance. Finally, a worker with coverage available through 
work may choose whether or not to take up coverage.  
 Certain choices, such as not working and self-employment, will limit individuals' access 
to group coverage. These individuals may choose to purchase non-group plans, enroll in public 
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coverage (if eligible), or be uninsured. The feasibility of the first two options depends on one's 
income level. Specifically, non-group plans may be too expensive for lower-income individuals. 
However, public coverage will not be available to individuals with higher income. Another 
option available to all individuals, including non-workers, is obtaining coverage through a family 
member who has access to group coverage.  
 Preferences and constraints will influence individual decisions at each step, which will in 
turn determine an individual's access to the various types of insurance coverage. Taste for 
insurance and risk attitude depend upon education levels, gender, racial/ethnic groups, 
citizenship status, and health conditions. While income is a major constraint, it is by no means 
the only factor that affects access to health insurance. Regardless of income levels, 
undocumented immigrants and legal temporary residents are ineligible for Medicaid. Even legal 
immigrants may have more limited access to employers that offer generous benefits, because 
citizenship is required to work for the U.S. federal government. Furthermore, foreign-born 
individuals without family members present in the U.S. cannot obtain insurance coverage 
through their parents or spouse.     
 The decision tree illustrated in Figure 1 suggests that the probability of having insurance 
coverage should be a function of employment characteristics, demographic variables, risk 
attitude, and health status. The next section describes the empirical strategy in more detail.    
B. Econometric Specification 
 In order to examine the immigrant-native insurance disparity and the role of risk attitude, 
I estimate the following equation using a probit model:  
           (1) 
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The probability of being uninsured is assumed to be a function of immigrant status, health status, 
and other individual characteristics.  is a dummy variable and equals one for the foreign-
born. The coefficient  thus captures the difference in the probabilities of being insured between 
immigrants and natives. X includes age, type of highest degree, female, race, married, family 
size, type of employment, family income, and region of residence. The equation allows for year-
to-year variation in insurance patterns by including year fixed effects, .  Health status is taken 
into account by including dummies for having excellent and very good health.  
 To understand the effect of risk attitude on health insurance purchases, I estimate 
equation (2) using a probit model: 
          (2) 
where  measures the correlation between risk attitude and being insured. Given the considerable 
differences between well-educated and less-educated immigrants documented in Table 1, both 
equations are estimated separately for the college-educated and less-than-college samples.  
C. Results  
1. Health Insurance Disparity between Immigrants and Natives 
 I begin the analysis by estimating the relationship between the probability of having 
health insurance and immigrant status using a probit model. The first specification controls for 
year fixed effects, health status, and demographic variables contained in X, as described in the 
previous section. The intervals of family income are $15,000-$24,999, $25,000-$34,999, 
$35,000-$44,999, $45,000-$54,999, $55,000-$64,999, $65,000-$74,999, and $75,000+. The 
second specification includes measures of health risk behaviors.  
Table 2 reports marginal probability effects of immigrant status on having insurance 
coverage in the working-age population with valid family income. Columns 1 and 2 contain 
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estimates in the less-educated sample, whereas results in Columns 3 and 4 are based on the 
college-educated population. Column 1 shows estimates from the first specification and indicates 
the probability of an immigrant without college education having insurance is 10.9 percentage 
points lower than that of a native-born individual. The coefficients on demographic 
characteristics show that women and married individuals are more likely to have insurance. 
Hispanics are at a greater disadvantage, relative to other racial and ethnic groups. Perhaps due to 
financial constraints, the probability of being insured reduces slightly with the number of people 
in the family.  
It is expected that the type of employment has significant effects on the availability of 
health insurance. Government employees often have more generous benefits than those working 
for private companies. However, self-employed individuals do not have access to a large health 
plan and frequently have to purchase private coverage at a much higher cost. The unemployed 
and those outside of the labor force may not be able to afford private insurance. Income increases 
purchasing power and should be negatively correlated with being uninsured. The estimates 
support most of these hypotheses. Compared to workers in private companies, federal, state, or 
local government employees are 10.7 percentage points more likely to have coverage. The self-
employed and unemployed individuals are 22.9 and 20.4 percentage points less likely to be 
insured, respectively. However, those outside of the labor force are 3.5 percentage points more 
likely to be insured, contradicting what one might expect. One explanation is that these 
individuals may qualify for public assistance and are therefore covered under government 
programs.  
The demand for health insurance is a function of health status, though the effect is 
ambiguous (Bass 2006). Being unhealthy likely increases the demand for medical services and 
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thus health insurance. On the other hand, individuals in poor health or those with pre-existing 
conditions may be denied private insurance coverage. The estimates demonstrate less-educated 
individuals in excellent health are 1.5 percentage points more likely to be insured, suggesting 
unhealthy individuals may have greater difficulty obtaining insurance.  
As expected, higher family income increases one’s probability of having coverage. 
Relative to individuals with family income under $15,000, those with family income of $25,000 
and above have a higher probability of being insured. Persons with family income between 
$15,000 and $25,000 have the lowest insurance rates, possibly because their income precludes 
them from public coverage yet private insurance is not affordable.  
Column (2) reveals that the insurance gap between immigrants and natives increases 
slightly from 10.9 to 11.7 percentage points, once risk-seeking behaviors are added to the model. 
Smokers and heavy drinkers are less likely to be insured. Since health risk factors are negatively 
correlated with being insured, there may be advantageous selection, as predicted by Hemenway 
(1990) and de Meza and Webb (2001). There is little change in the other coefficients in this 
specification.  
Column (3) contains estimates of equation (1) in the college-educated population and 
illustrates that the immigrant-native insurance gap is smaller than that in the less-educated 
sample. While education has been known to improve access to health insurance, prior research 
has not examined the highly-educated population. The estimates in this table suggest that college 
education cannot completely close the insurance gap between immigrants and natives. Most of 
the other covariates have similar effects on insurance rates as in the less-than-college sample. 
College-educated Hispanics have the lowest insurance rates. In addition, college-educated 
women and married individuals are more likely to have insurance coverage. The likelihood of 
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being insured decreases slightly with one's family size. Contrasting with the estimates in the less-
educated sample, highly-educated individuals who are outside of the labor force are more likely 
to lack insurance. Given their higher family income, college-educated individuals probably are 
not eligible for government-sponsored coverage. Interestingly, insurance rates for individuals 
who are in excellent and poor health are not significantly different. Since the highly-educated are 
more likely to work for employers who offer insurance, having poor health may not preclude 
them from obtaining group coverage.   
Estimates of equation (2) based on the college-educated population are presented in 
Column (4). The immigrant-native differential in health insurance has reduced slightly from 3.1 
to 3.0 percentage points. Although educated smokers are less likely to be insured, the correlation 
between heavy drinking and insurance coverage is not statistically significant. These results 
suggest there is no evidence of adverse selection in the college-educated sample. The other 
coefficients remain quantitatively similar to those in Column (3).  
The estimates in Table 2 demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, immigrants have lower rates 
of health insurance than their native counterparts. While less-educated immigrants have an 11 
percentage points lower probability than natives to be insured, highly-educated immigrants 
remain vulnerable. The immigrant-native gap is around 3 percentage points in the college-
educated sample. Risk attitude plays a somewhat different role in the highly-educated and less-
educated populations. Smoking reduces the probability of being insured in both samples, but 
heavy drinking only has an effect on insurance rates in the less-than-college sample.       
The literature documents immigrants as a group are less likely to work for an employer 
that offers health insurance. The next section examines how employer-sponsored coverage 
contributes to the immigrant-native disparity in health insurance.  
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2. Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance (ESI) 
 To understand how ESI affects the health coverage differential, I limit the sample to 
workers and include a dummy variable for having health insurance available at work in each 
specification. The NHIS asks adult workers whether health insurance was offered to them 
through their work place. This question ensures a positive answer to indicate the respondent is 
eligible for ESI rather than simply being in a firm that offers insurance. This section of the 
analysis focuses on private insurance rather than combining all types of insurance, since ESI is 
classified as private insurance. Table 3 presents estimates of the differential in having private 
health insurance between immigrant and native workers from two probit models for the college-
educated and less-than-college samples. In panel A, the sample includes all workers. The less-
educated immigrant-native differential is 5.7 percentage points in the first specification and 
slightly increases to 6.4 percentage points when risk measures are added (Columns 1 and 2). The 
estimates in Columns 3 and 4 reveal a private insurance gap of 1.9 percentage points, between 
college-educated immigrants and natives. As expected, having ESI significantly improves 
insurance coverage for both groups. The probability of workers with ESI being insured is 39 
percentage points higher for the less-educated and 20 percentage points higher for the college-
educated (Row 2). Since the disparity is notably smaller in the sample of workers, after 
accounting for the availability of ESI, these estimates illustrate that ESI plays a crucial role in 
explaining immigrants’ lower rate of insurance coverage.4 Risky behaviors again reduce the 
probability of having insurance for workers of both education levels, suggesting no evidence of 
adverse selection. 
It is possible that some immigrants choose not to take up ESI due to lower expected 
usage of medical services or imperfect knowledge of medical costs. I consider this possibility by 
                                                            
4 The estimated differential based on all types of insurance combined rather than private insurance is quantitatively similar.   
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exploring the immigrant-native differential in take-up rates. The same series of probit regressions 
are estimated using the sample of workers who have health insurance available at work. Panel B 
of Table 3 contains the results and illustrates immigrants of both education levels are less likely 
to take up private insurance, conditional on working for an employer that offers coverage. The 
gap is quite small, ranging from 0.7 to one percentage point. The difference in the ability to 
purchase private coverage between immigrant and natives is taken into account by controlling 
for income. Without including risk variables, the immigrant-native insurance gap is the same in 
both education levels. The inclusion of risky behaviors has no effect on immigrant-native 
differential in the college-educated sample but increases the less-educated gap by 0.4 percentage 
point. Buchmueller et al. (2007) conduct a similar analysis using workers of all education levels 
in the 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and find little difference in take-
up rates between immigrants and natives. The estimates on take-up rates in this study provide 
implications for future research and suggest it would be of interest to investigate why some 
immigrants, including the well-educated, remain uninsured when coverage is available. 
V. Discussion  
The present research contributes to the growing literature on immigrant-native insurance 
disparities in two key ways. First, the study examines current insurance status, employer-
sponsored health coverage, and insurance take-up rates, whereas most papers consider only 
insurance status. Second, the analyses are conducted separately for the highly-educated and less-
educated samples to take into account heterogeneity in the population as well as different risk 
attitudes between the two groups. This study brings attention to college-educated immigrants, 
which is a group that has been neglected in the literature due to their relatively high 
socioeconomic status.  
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Analysis based on the pooled 1998-2006 NHIS illustrates that immigrants of both 
education levels have lower rates of health insurance coverage, after adjusting for demographic 
characteristics, employment, income, and health status. Much of the disparity can be explained 
by immigrants’ lower probability of working for an employer that offers health insurance, which 
confirms results in prior research. While the unexplained gap is small, it would be of interest for 
policy-makers to understand reasons behind the take-up differential. It might be helpful to 
consider non-financial barriers, including the availability of information regarding how to 
purchase insurance at work and which plan will provide adequate coverage.  
Risk plays an important role in insurance status for individuals of different education 
levels, though heavy drinking does not have significant explanatory power for insurance 
coverage in the college-educated sample. I find no evidence of adverse selection, since the 
estimates reveal a negative correlation between risk-seeking behaviors and insurance coverage. 
In general, immigrants are less likely to engage in risky behaviors, contradicting common belief.    
A couple of potential limitations of the research should be acknowledged. First, there 
may be non-financial barriers that can partially explain the insurance gap but are not available in 
the NHIS, including English proficiency and the location where an immigrant's degree was 
obtained. Because some U.S. employers lack adequate information to evaluate foreign 
credentials, immigrants with foreign education may have to work in lower-skilled jobs that offer 
no health benefits. Psychological attributes, such as decisiveness, have been shown to have effect 
on acquiring coverage, but no such measures are available in the data set (Dolinsky and Caputo 
1997).  Second, the NHIS does not contain information on firm sizes, which may influence the 
cost of individual insurance plans. Larger firms are more likely to offer insurance coverage and 
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may face lower insurance costs due to economies of scale. Immigrants may have more limited 
access to affordable plans if they are disproportionally concentrated in small firms.  
Immigrants have increasingly become the focus of policy debates to expand insurance 
coverage. The present research confirms results in previous studies and finds unexplained 
insurance disparities between less-educated immigrants and natives. Even though the public may 
not consider college-educated immigrants to be particularly vulnerable, this study demonstrates 
they are still more likely to be uninsured. In fact, the immigrant-native gap in take-up rates is 
similar in the college-educated and less-than-college populations. Because highly-educated 
individuals earn more than the less-educated, college-educated immigrants are often ineligible 
for Medicaid even if they become naturalized citizens. Outreach efforts must therefore be 
extended to highly-educated immigrants to encourage them to take up employer-based health 
insurance or purchase private insurance. Greater education, including information in non-English 
languages, both at the workplace and at health insurance exchanges could help immigrants 
understand how to obtain appropriate insurance coverage. Moreover, future policies should take 
into account the considerable differences in the demographic and employment characteristics 
between highly-educated and less-educated immigrants. The decision to purchase health 
insurance may differ between the two groups. Workers with higher income are actually found to 
be less responsive to price of health insurance (Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin 2001). Initiatives 
aimed at improving insurance coverage for less-educated and undocumented immigrants, such as 
vouchers and tax credits, may be ineffective among highly-educated immigrants.  
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics by Education Level and Nativity (1998-2006 NHIS)  
  Working-Age Less than College   Working-Age College and Above 
U.S.-Born Foreign-born U.S.-Born Foreign-born 
Share of the Sample 87.30% 12.70% 86.67% 13.33% 
Currently Uninsured 0.188 0.401 0.062 0.132 
 (0.002) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.005) 
Has Private Insurance 0.686 0.474 0.903 0.827 
 (0.003) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.006) 
Currently smokes 0.330 0.182 0.123 0.115 
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.004) 
Has drinking problem 0.019 0.008 0.009 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 39.436 38.003 41.034 39.193 
 (0.103) (0.117)  (0.092) (0.187) 
Married 0.459 0.570 0.548 0.613 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.007) 
Female 0.537 0.521 0.530 0.477 
 (0.002) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.007) 
Family size (Number of people) 2.542 3.168 2.362 2.540 
 (0.010) (0.018)  (0.013) (0.024) 
White 0.778 0.185 0.879 0.349 
 (0.003) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.008) 
Hispanic 0.059 0.593 0.026 0.171 
 (0.002) (0.007)  (0.001) (0.005) 
Asian 0.005 0.132 0.013 0.389 
 (0.000) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.008) 
Black 0.146 0.083 0.076 0.084 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.004) 
Private company employee 0.574 0.592 0.534 0.590 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.008) 
Government employee 0.097 0.050 0.239 0.144 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.005) 
Self-employed or family business 0.063 0.064 0.083 0.079 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.004) 
Unemployed 0.038 0.038 0.019 0.032 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.003) 
Family income over 20,000 0.748 0.670 0.926 0.873 
 (0.004) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.006) 
Health status = excellent 0.286 0.308 0.460 0.438 
 (0.002) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.007) 
Health status =  very good 0.338 0.302 0.356 0.340 
 (0.002) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.007) 
Health status = good, fair, or poor 0.376 0.389 0.184 0.221 
 (0.003) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.006) 
N 106,513 23,620    37,629  6,671  
 Note: Weighted by sampling weights to account for complex survey design. Standard deviations in parentheses. Italics indicate 
the difference within group is not significant at 5%.  
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Table 2  
Immigrant-Native Disparities in Health Insurance Coverage 
Probit Regressions (1998-2006 NHIS) 
  Outcome = Probability of Having Health Insurance 
Working-Age Less than College Working-Age College and Above 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign-Born -0.109*** -0.117*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Risk-Taking: Smoker -0.058*** -0.023*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Risk-Taking: Drinking problem -0.055*** -0.013 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Married 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Family Size -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Hispanic -0.055*** -0.065*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Asian 0.032*** 0.028*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) 
Black 0.009*** 0.001 -0.011*** -0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Government employee 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Self-employed or family business -0.229*** -0.234*** -0.095*** -0.094*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unemployed -0.204*** -0.196*** -0.172*** -0.170*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) 
Not in the labor force 0.035*** 0.033*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Health = Excellent 0.015*** 0.008** 0.003 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Health = Very Good 0.008*** 0.004 0.004* 0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Family Income   
$15,000-$24,999 
-0.007* -0.008** -0.003 -0.003 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Family Income       
$25,000-$34,999 
0.056*** 0.054*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Family Income      
$35,000-$44,999 
0.101*** 0.098*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Family Income       
$45,000-$54,999 
0.126*** 0.124*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Family Income       
$55,000-$64,999 
0.140*** 0.138*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Family Income       
$65,000-$74,999 
0.150*** 0.148*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Family Income      
$75,000+ 
0.183*** 0.180*** 0.103*** 0.101*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
N 130,133 130,133 44,300 44,300 
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Weighted by sampling weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression also 
controls for age-squared, education, race, region, and year fixed effects.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3  
Immigrant-Native Disparities in Employer-Based Health Insurance  
Probit Regressions (1998-2006 NHIS) 
Outcome = Probability of Having Private Health Insurance 
Working-Age Less than College Working-Age College and Above 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. All workers  
Foreign-Born -0.057*** -0.064*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Employer offers insurance 0.393*** 0.393*** 0.203*** 0.201*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Risk-Taking: Smoker -0.072*** -0.027*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Risk-Taking: Drinking problem -0.028** -0.000 
  (0.012)  (0.013) 
N 93,345 93,345 37,515 37,515 
B. Workers with employers that offer health insurance 
Foreign-Born -0.007* -0.011** -0.007* -0.007* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Risk-Taking: Smoker -0.031*** -0.013*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Risk-Taking: Drinking problem -0.009 -0.006 
  (0.010)  (0.015) 
N 61,905 61,905 30,708 30,708 
Notes: Marginal effects reported. Weighted by sampling weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each model also controls for age, age-squared, married, female, family size, dummies 
for Hispanic, Asian, black, native American, other race, master's,  professional degree, doctorate, live in the 
northeast, west, south, and year.  
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Figure 1 
Individual's Decision to Purchase Health Insurance 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Blumberg and Nichols (2004). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion and Policy Significance 
 This dissertation includes three essays and examines various aspects of high-skilled 
immigration in the United States. The research focuses on the high-skilled labor market, whereas 
previous studies either treat all immigrants as a homogeneous group or focus on the low-skilled. 
The first essay investigates the wage consequences of high-skilled immigration. The second 
essay evaluates the international transferability of human capital in nursing. The third essay 
compares immigrant-native health insurance disparities in highly-educated and less-educated 
populations. Another key contribution of this dissertation is the utilization of high quality data 
sets. Using a rich data set on the high-skilled population and incorporating a new instrumental 
variable based on education fields, the first essay finds a significant wage effect of college-
educated immigrant that was not found in past studies. In the second essay, a survey of the 
nation's registered nurses, along with the ability to control for additional individual 
characteristics than are available in other data sets, allows me to estimate a more accurate return 
on foreign education. The analysis in the third essay is based on a data set that contains measures 
of risk attitude, which are found to be crucial determinants of health insurance demand. More 
precise estimates of insurance take-up rates are also possible due to the available details on 
employer-sponsored insurance. Altogether, this dissertation brings to light the value of quality 
data sets in empirical analysis.     
 In the first essay, I evaluate the effect of high-skilled immigrants in science and 
engineering on wages of similarly-skilled U.S. natives. The extensive literature on all immigrants 
finds no significant impact of immigration on native wages. Using a factor proportions model, I 
estimate the elasticity of substitution between foreign- and U.S.-born workers with a bachelor's 
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degree or higher. Empirical results cannot reject the hypothesis that immigrants and natives are 
perfect substitutes within the same skill group. Because the presence of immigrants in an 
occupation is endogenous, an instrumental variable approach is employed to calculate the wage 
impact of increased immigration. I introduce a new instrument, using the fact that many 
immigrants were educated in their home country and chose the field of study based on their 
home labor market conditions. This instrument passes both the weak instrument and under-
identification tests. The instrumental variable estimates show that a ten percent increase in 
employment due to an influx of high-skilled immigrants reduces wages of natives in the same 
occupation by 2.8 to 4.4 percent. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions that 
increased labor supply puts downward pressure on wages. However, the increased supply of 
immigrants in engineering, computer, and mathematical sciences does not lower wages of 
natives in these occupations. A series of robustness checks reveal that the effect of immigration 
varies across subsamples. Specifically, immigration has larger negative wage effects on male 
native workers but does not reduce wages of female natives. In addition, the adverse wage 
impact is more severe on older natives due to lower occupational mobility of older workers. 
Because there is growing demand for workers on the coasts, the negative wage effect is slightly 
larger on natives in interior areas than natives on the coasts. Finally, the estimates are not 
sensitive to the assumption of zero occupational mobility or the inclusion of non-workers in the 
construction of immigrant concentration in an occupation.  
The second essay investigates the transferability of foreign human capital in the 
occupation of nursing. The immigration literature shows that the returns to foreign education are 
lower, though previous studies typically use indirect information on foreign education or ignore 
the heterogeneous nature of foreign human capital across occupations. The labor market for 
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nurses is especially important because of the growing nursing shortage and its potentially 
negative impact on the quality of health care. Wage regressions reveal that nurses who obtained 
basic nursing education outside the U.S. earn a four percent premium relative to U.S.-educated 
nurses. Additionally, immigrant nurses with only foreign education do not suffer a wage penalty. 
These estimates contrast with past research and highlight the heterogeneity in the value of 
foreign human capital. The results also suggest foreign education penalty in occupations with 
licensing requirements should be minimal. More in-depth analysis indicates that the foreign 
education premium is driven by nurses from English-speaking countries and hospital nurses 
located in areas with severe shortages. Foreign nurses likely have a higher level of English 
proficiency than average immigrants, because 85 percent of FENs come from English-speaking 
countries. Given that proficiency in the destination language increases earnings, it is expected 
that the returns on foreign human capital would be higher for nurses than in the general 
population. The unexpected finding is that foreign nurses from countries with an official 
language other than English experience no wage penalty, confirming the labor market for nurses 
is unique. Furthermore, part of the foreign education premium can be explained by foreign-
trained nurses working in cities with severe shortages, where recruiters are willing to pay higher 
wages. Finally, the results are not sensitive to overtime pay, even though foreign-educated nurses 
work more overtime hours than U.S. nurses. Estimates based on Right to Work (RTW) and non-
Right to Work states suggest that unions do not play a significant role in compressing the wage 
differential between foreign- and U.S.-educated nurses.   
 The third essay answers two questions on health insurance. First, does the immigrant-
native disparity in health insurance coverage differ across education levels? Second, can risk 
attitude predict the demand for insurance? My analysis illustrates that immigrants have lower 
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rates of health insurance coverage, controlling for demographic characteristics, employment, 
income, risk attitude, and health status. Though less-educated immigrants are at a larger 
disadvantage than well-educated immigrants, a significant immigrant-native coverage gap still 
exists in the highly-educated population. Much of the disparity can be attributed to the 
differential between immigrants and natives in the likelihood of working for an employer that 
offers health insurance. Having coverage available through work reduces the probability of being 
uninsured by 20 and 39 percentage points for the college-educated and less-educated workers, 
respectively. Conditioning on working for an employer that provides insurance, immigrants, 
regardless of education level, are less likely to take up coverage. The estimates also indicate that 
health risk-seeking behaviors play an important role in insurance status for individuals of both 
education levels. The correlation between risk and insurance coverage is negative, suggesting no 
evidence of adverse selection. Contrary to common perception, immigrants are not more likely to 
engage in risky behaviors.  
 Empirical results in this dissertation have important policy implications as the U.S. 
discusses the overhaul of immigration and health care systems. The first essay finds a negative 
effect of high-skilled immigration on wages of U.S.-born workers in certain occupations. One 
potential strategy may be to impose limits on work visas issued to occupations that are more 
adversely affected by immigration. University scholarships may be given to encourage domestic 
students to pursue careers in occupations that heavily rely on immigrant workers due to labor 
shortages. Nevertheless, restricting high-skilled immigrants to keep native workers’ wages 
higher could mean forgoing significant benefits from immigration, including increased economic 
activity, knowledge flows, innovation, and diversity. 
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 The second essay indicates that foreign-educated and domestically-trained nurses are 
viewed as close substitutes by U.S. employers. The licensing requirement provides information 
for domestic employers, who may otherwise have difficulty evaluating foreign credentials. 
Recruiting licensed nurses from abroad could be one way of filling vacant positions with 
qualified nurses temporarily. However, additional analysis of the relative quality of patient care 
provided by foreign nurses is necessary to give informed policy recommendations. Furthermore, 
there are ethical concerns regarding hiring nurses from developing countries that also experience 
a nursing shortage. 
 The third essay suggests immigrants, regardless of education level, are less likely to have 
health insurance. The immigrant disadvantage in insurance take-up rates among highly-educated 
individuals is an unexpected finding, given that college-educated immigrants outperform their 
native counterparts in the labor market. Employers, practitioners, and policy makers must 
continue to remind highly-educated immigrants about both the benefits of obtaining health 
insurance and the costs of being uninsured in the long run. 
In total, these essays show that high-skilled immigrants are distinctively different from 
the low-skilled in terms of socioeconomic characteristics, human capital, and health outcomes. 
Therefore the separate empirical analyses and policy considerations discussed in this dissertation 
are justified.  
 
